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I. Presentation 
The present Electronic Journal is one of the key products of the Project entitled ‘Return Directive 
Dialogue’ (REDIAL). The overall aim of the REDIAL Project is to facilitate horizontal judicial 
dialogue among judges of the Member States, who are involved in return procedures.
1
 The starting 
premise of the Project is that informed horizontal and vertical judicial interactions lead to an effective 
implementation of the Return Directive, while ensuring at the same time respect of the European 
fundamental rights as consecrated by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
The REDIAL Project develops a toolkit including: a Database comprising national, EU and 
ECHR landmark judgments on the interpretation and application of the Return Directive that offers an 
efficient tool to search in all the cases that have been collected (not least than 341 at this stage); 
national reports analyzing the added value of national judgments on the Return Directive; European 
synthesis reports, one for each of the Chapters II-IV of the Return Directive offering an analysis of the 
legal provisions of the Return Directive, CJEU relevant judgments and case law of Member States; an 
annotated Directive including for each provision the references to the case law of the Court of Justice. 
From a methodological point of view, the project relies upon close collaboration between judges 
and academics from the EU Member States. At the national level, judges are in charge of the selection 
of landmark judgments on the Return Directive, while academics are responsible for synthesizing their 
added value in a national report. The jurisprudence is collected in three stages following the structure 
of the Return Directive. The first package covers the provisions of Chapter II of the Return Directive 
(Articles 7 to 11) dealing successively with voluntary departure, removal and postponement of 
removal, return and removal of unaccompanied minors, and entry bans. The second package will 
focus on Chapter III of the Return Directive (Articles 12-14) about procedural safeguards, while the 
third package will address Chapter IV (Article 15 -18) on detention for the purpose of removal. 
The project is developed by the Migration Policy Centre (MPC) and the Centre for Judicial 
Cooperation (CJC) of the European University Institute (EUI) together with the Academic Network 
for Legal Studies on Immigration and Asylum in Europe known as the ‘Odysseus Network’ 
coordinated by the Université Libre de Bruxelles. The MPC is in charge of its scientific coordination, 
while the Odysseus Network provides national expertise and its network of contacts throughout the 
EU, including with judges.  
The present issue of the REDIAL Journal is the first one of the three that will be published in the 
course of 2016 dealing successively with Chapter II, III and IV of the Return Directive. It covers 
Chapter II related to the termination of illegal stay. 
The Electronic Journal is structured in three main parts. The first part starts by offering a concise 
summary of the relevant preliminary rulings delivered by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU). The follow-up national judgments that are rarely available are provided because they show 
how the preliminary ruling is implemented at the national level and help to evaluate the impact of the 
preliminary reference on national jurisprudence. The second part continues with a comparative 
presentation of landmark national judgments originating from 19 Member States. This section 
illustrates the essential role of national courts for the clarification of the scope and meaning of Articles 
7-11 of the Return Directive. The third part is devoted to an analysis of the various modes of judicial 
interactions that have developed between the European and national judges but also between national 
judges from different Member States in a kind of transnational judicial dialogue.  
                                                     
1 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and 
procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third country nationals, OJ L 348/98, 24.12.2008 (hereinafter 
Return Directive). 
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The REDIAL Journal should be of interest for national and European judges specialised in 
migration law, but also for national administrations in charge of return procedures, NGOs defending 
third country nationals, specialized lawyers and finally the European Commission and the Court of 
Justice in charge of controlling the implementation of the Return Directive that remains a key 
instrument of the immigration policy in a context where balancing the effectiveness of the Return 
Directive and the rights of third country nationals becomes more and more a daily challenge. 
II. Landmark European Case-Law Related to the Termination of Illegal Stay (Chapter 
II Of The Return Directive) 
In the five years since its adoption, the Return Directive has been the subject of an increasing 
number of preliminary references addressed by national courts to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU), mostly (but not only) as regards its provisions on the detention of irregular migrants. 
Lately, the CJEU has been asked to clarify other key concepts, such as those related to the termination 
of illegal stay: the mandatory nature of voluntary departure, when none of the exceptions provided in 
Article 7(3) and (4) apply (Zaizoune); the definition of the concept of ‘risk to public policy’ as a 
grounds for refusing voluntary departure (Z.Zh. and O.); the different types of removal measures 
within the remit of Article 8 (El Dridi, Achughbabian, Sagor, Mbaye), as well as the practical 
implications of administrative entry bans within the context of the return procedures (Filev and 
Osmani and Skerdjan Celaj).  
 C-38/14, Zaizoune, CJEU Judgment of 23 April 2015 
National court requesting a preliminary ruling: Tribunal Superior de Justicia de la Comunidad 
Autónoma del País Vasco (Spain, High Court of the Basque Country)  
Factual context: proceedings brought against Mr Zaizoune, relating to his illegal stay on Spanish 
territory. Under national legislation, as interpreted by the Spanish Courts, illegally staying third-
country nationals may be punished in Spain only by a fine, in the absence of any additional 
aggravating factors, instead of removal from national territory. 
Legal provision at issue: Article 8(1) read in conjunction with Article 6(1) RD 
Questions addressed by the national court: ‘In the light of the principles of sincere cooperation 
and the effectiveness of directives, must Articles 4(2), 4(3) and 6(1) of Directive 2008/115 be 
interpreted as meaning that they preclude legislation such as the national legislation at issue in the 
main proceedings and the case-law which interprets it, pursuant to which the illegal stay of a foreign 
national [on the national territory] may be punishable just by a financial penalty, which, moreover, 
may not be imposed concurrently with the penalty of removal?’ 
Conclusion: Once it has been established that a stay is illegal, the national authorities must, 
pursuant to Article 6(1) – without prejudice to the exceptions laid down by Article 6(2) to (5) 
thereof – adopt a return decision. In cases where the third-country national has not complied with 
the obligation to return, Article 8(1) of Directive 2008/115 requires Member States, in order to 
ensure the effectiveness of return procedures, to take all measures necessary to carry out the 
removal of the person concerned. This has to be fulfilled as quickly as possible.  
It follows that national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings does not meet the 
clear requirements of Articles 6(1) and 8(1) of Directive 2008/115.  
Member States’ right to derogate, pursuant to Article 4(2) and (3) of Directive 2008/115, from the 
standards and procedures set out by that directive, cannot affect that conclusion. 
CJEU Judgment: Fourth Chamber, 23 April 2015  
REDIAL Electronic Journal on Judicial Interaction and the EU Return Policy – First Edition: Articles 7 to 11 of the Return Directive 2008/115 
REDIAL RR 2016/02 9 
REDIAL Blog: GORTAZAR ROTAECHE C. J., FERRÉ TRAD, N., A fine or removal? The 
impact of the ECJ’s Zaizoune Judgment on the Spanish Doctrine, 19 June 2015 
Follow-up national decision: On 8 July 2015, the High Court of the Basque Country interpreted 
the Court’s finding in Zaizoune as not preventing Spanish authorities from relying on Article 6 
paragraphs 2 to 5, with a view to granting the third country-national permission or a right to stay in 
specific circumstances. In any other cases, a return/expulsion decision must be issued, without the 
possibility of replacing it with an economic sanction; at least in the absence of aggravating factors. 
The High Court thus rejected the appeal lodged by the administrative authority of Gipuzkoa 
(Tribunal Superior de Justicia, Sala de lo Contencioso, 195/2013, STSJ PV 2102/2015)  
 C-554/13, Zh. and O, CJEU Judgment of 11 June 2015 
National court requesting a preliminary ruling: Raad Van State (Netherlands, Council of State)  
Factual context: Mr. Zh, third-country national, was given a custodial sentence of two months for 
being in possession of a false travel document on the basis of the Dutch Criminal Code. After a 
month and half he was issued a removal order and placed immediately in pre-removal detention. 
The complaints introduced by Zh. were rejected by both the administration and first instance court 
on the basis that the offence committed justified the denial of a voluntary departure period.  
Mr. O, staying in the Netherlands after the expiration of his short stay visa, was arrested and 
detained on suspicion of domestic abuse. According to Dutch law, any suspicion confirmed by the 
chief of police or any conviction in connection with an act punishable as a criminal offence in 
national law is considered to be a risk to public policy. 
Both Zh and O were deported after lodging appeals before the Council of State, and thus before the 
preliminary references was addressed to the CJEU. 
Legal provision at issue: Article 7(4) RD 
Questions addressed by the national court: the Council of State wanted to know how to interpret 
the concept of ‘risk to public policy’ provided by Article 7(4) RD. In particular, whether ‘public 
policy’ should have the same meaning as the ‘public policy’ to which the EU Citizens’ and Family 
Reunification Directives refer, or whether it should be interpreted more broadly, “with the 
consequence that the mere suspicion that a third-country national has committed an act punishable 
as a criminal offence under national law may be sufficient to establish that that third-country 
national poses a ‘risk to public policy’”. (para. 34) 
Conclusion: Article 7(4) RD must be interpreted as precluding a national practice whereby a third-
country national, who is staying illegally within the territory of a Member State, is deemed to pose a 
risk to public policy within the meaning of that provision on the sole grounds that that national is 
suspected, or has been criminally convicted, of an act punishable as a criminal offence under 
national law. (para. 50) ‘[…] other factors, such as the nature and seriousness of that act, the time 
which has elapsed since it was committed and the fact that that national was in the process of 
leaving the territory of that Member State when he was detained by the national authorities, may be 
relevant in the assessment of whether he poses a risk to public policy within the meaning of that 
provision. Any matter which relates to the reliability of the suspicion that the third-country national 
concerned committed the alleged criminal offence, as the case may be, is also relevant to that 
assessment.’ The assessment of the concept of ‘risk to public policy’ within the meaning of Article 
7(4) of RD must be made on a case-by-case basis, and presupposes ‘the existence, in addition to the 
perturbation of the social order which any infringement of the law involves, of a genuine, present 
and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society.’ (para. 60) 
The CJEU did not establish whether the TCNs did or did not pose a threat to public policy, since the 
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determination of whether they posed a risk to the public policy of the Member States fell on the 
referring court. However the Court highlighted certain facts which are of particular relevance for the 
determination of risk in these cases. Namely, the fact that Mr. Zh. was in the process of leaving the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands when he was arrested. While, in the case of Mr O. the fact that he did 
not possess any documentation substantiating the accusation of abuse made against him. ‘This fact 
can give indications on the credibility of the suspicion that he committed the alleged act.’ (para. 64) 
CJEU Judgment: Third Chamber, 11 June 2015 
REDIAL Blog: G. CORNELISSE, Zh. and O.: EU law and the ‘Constitutionalisation’ of the 
Exercise of Migration Control, 17 July 2015 
Follow-up national decision: The Council of State started its judgment by reiterating the 
requirements established by the CJEU. These are that the individual examination and principle of 
proportionality requires Member State not to rely on a general practice or a presumption to establish 
that there is a risk to public policy without taking into proper account the personal conduct of the 
third-country national and the danger that his or her conduct poses to public order. It pointed out 
that the Secretary of State must include all factual and legal elements, concerning the alien in 
relation to a past criminal offense, including the nature and seriousness of the offense, including his 
or her conduct since the commission thereof. The aforementioned factual and legal elements 
should not necessarily be limited to the data reviewed by the criminal courts. The removal 
order should thus substantiate all factual and legal grounds that led to the conclusion that 
there was a threat to public policy. 
The Council of States noted that the TCNs were not heard prior to the imposition of the return 
decision. An obligation, which was incumbent on the administrative body on the basis of the 
judgment of the Court in C-349/07, Sopropé, and the EU law general principle of defence. However, 
the removal order was not automatically annulled based on the violation of the right to be heard. 
According to the judgment of the Court in C-383/13 PPU, M. G. and N. R, the national court may 
order the annulment of removal, only if it considers, with regard to all the factual and legal 
circumstances of the case, that this violation has actually deprived the TCN of the opportunity to 
defend himself in such a way that the administrative decision could have had a different outcome. 
The Council held that the State had sufficiently convincing reasons that the alien is a real and 
present danger to public order due to the nature (drug related offence), the length (eight years) of the 
offence and the postponement of the third country-national’s departure for unsustainable reasons. 
Additionally, the appellants had no social or family ties with the Netherlands. This led to the 
conclusion that the appellants had not been deprived of the principle of defence in order to defend 
themselves in such a way that the decision could have had a different outcome. The Council also 
rejected the second grounds of appeal of Mr O, namely that the travel ban constitutes an interference 
with his family life under Article 8 ECHR. It did so as the appellant did not substantiate his claim 
that there was a family life with his alleged wife. (the full judgment is available at Raad Van State, 
201407197/1/V3. 20 November 2015 NL only) 
 C-61/11, El Dridi, CJEU Judgment of 28 April 2011 
National court requesting a preliminary ruling: Corte d’Appello di Trento (Italy, Court of 
Appeal of Trento) 
Factual context: proceedings brought against Mr. El Dridi, who was sentenced to one year’s 
imprisonment for having stayed illegally on Italian territory without valid grounds, contrary to a 
removal order made against him by the Chief of Police (Questore).  
Legal provision at issue: Article 15 and 16 read in conjunction with Article 8(1) and (4) RD 
Questions addressed by the national court: in the light of the principle of sincere cooperation and 
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proportionality, do Articles 15 and 16 of Directive 2008/115 preclude: the possibility that criminal 
penalties (here a prison sentence of up to 4 years) may be imposed in respect of a breach of an 
intermediate stage in the administrative return procedure, before that procedure is completed, by 
having recourse to the most severe administrative measure of constraint which remains available? 
Conclusion: Member States may not, in order to remedy the failure of coercive measures adopted 
in order to carry out forced removal pursuant to Article 8(4) of that directive, provide for a custodial 
sentence, on the sole grounds that a third-country national continues to stay illegally on the territory 
of a Member State after an order to leave the national territory was given and the period granted in 
that order had expired; rather, they must pursue their efforts to enforce the return decision, which 
continues to produce its effects. Indeed, such a penalty, due inter alia to its conditions and methods 
of application, risks jeopardising the attainment of the objective pursued by that Directive. 
CJEU Judgment: First Chamber, 28 April 2011 
Follow-up national decision: Following this CJEU’s finding, the Italian judge disregarded the 
national norm, which contradicted the Return Directive in the pending case. In appeal, the Court 
ruled against the conviction provided by former Article 14, 5-ter of the Consolidated Immigration 
Act as well as the execution of the expulsion order issued on the basis of the said provision. The 
Italian Supreme Court of Cassation cancelled the various pending lawsuits that were deemed to 
have an ‘inexistent legal basis’ – and therefore solved the uncertainties of interpretation that existed 
in Italy at that time. See inter alia (v. inter alia, Cass., I sess. crim., sent. n. 22105/2011; Cass., IV 
sess. civ., ord. n. 18481/2011). 
 C-329/11, Achughbabian, CJEU Judgment of 6 December 2011 
National court requesting a preliminary ruling: Cour d’Appel de Paris (France, Court of Appeal 
of Paris)  
Factual context: dispute between Mr Achughbabian and the Prefect of Val-de-Marne concerning 
Mr Achughbabian’s illegal stay on French territory. Being suspected of having committed and 
continuing to commit the offence set out in Article L. 621-1 of Ceseda (i.e. having entered or 
residing in France without complying with the provisions of Articles L. 211-1 and L. 311-1 and/or 
remaining in France beyond the period authorised by a previous visa) Mr Achughbabian was placed 
in police custody. 
Questions addressed by the national court: Taking into account its scope, does Directive 
2008/115/EC preclude national legislation, such as Article L.621-1 of the French Code on the entry 
and stay of foreign nationals and on the right to asylum, which provides for the imposition of a 
sentence of imprisonment on a third-country national on the sole grounds of his illegal entry or 
residence in national territory? 
Legal provision at issue: Article 8 RD 
Conclusion: As a principle, Directive 2008/115 does not preclude national legislation which 
classifies an illegal stay by a third-country national as an offence and provides for penal sanctions. 
These might include a term of imprisonment, to prevent such a stay. Nor does it forbid the detention 
of a third-country national in order to determine whether or not his or her stay is legal. Nevertheless, 
during the procedure provided for by the Directive, the imposition and enforcement of a sentence of 
imprisonment appears more problematic as it is likely to ‘delay the removal’ and infringe the 
requirements of effectiveness referred to, for example, in recital 4 of Directive 2008/115.  
Criminal sentences ‘do not contribute to the carrying through of the removal which that procedure is 
intended to achieve, namely, the physical transportation of the person concerned out of the Member 
State concerned. Such a sentence does not therefore constitute a ‘measure’ or a ‘coercive measure’ 
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within the meaning of Article 8 of Directive 2008/115.’ The Directive does not preclude as such 
criminal penalties for illegal stays, in so far as that legislation permits the imprisonment of a third-
country national who, ‘though staying illegally in the territory of the said Member State and not 
being willing to leave that territory voluntarily, has not been subject to the coercive measures 
referred to in Article 8 of that directive and has not, being placed in detention with a view to the 
preparation and carrying out of his removal, yet reached the end of the maximum term of that 
detention.’  
This finding does not apply to imprisonment of a third-country national to whom the return 
procedure established by the said directive has been applied and who is staying illegally in that 
territory with no justified grounds for non-return. 
CJEU Judgment: Grand Chamber, 6 December 2011 
Follow-up national decision: While the CJUE’s decision was expected to bring out the general 
misinterpretation and reluctance of the French courts vis-à-vis El Dridi, it led rather to diverging 
interpretations from the judges with regard to the conformity of Article L.621-1 CESEDA with EU 
law. On 7 and 8 December 2011, the Court of Appeal of Paris issued two contradictory decisions, 
one confirming the regularity of the prison sentence in reference to the CJEU’s decision (CA Paris, 
B 11/04993); the other disregarding the French provision in favour of the Court’s case-law and 
ordering the immediate release of the foreigner based on his unlawful detention (CA Paris, B 11 
04971). 
 See e.g. http://combatsdroitshomme.blog.lemonde.fr/2011/12/08/memes-causes-meme-cacophonie-
judiciaire-les-suites-dachughbabian-cjue-6-decembre-2011/ (only in FR).  
 C-430/11, Sagor, CJEU Judgment of 6 December 2012 
National court requesting a preliminary ruling: Tribunale di Rovigo (Italy, Tribunal of Rovigo) 
Factual context: proceedings brought against Mr Sagor concerning his illegal stay in Italy. In 2010, 
Mr Sagor was summoned before the Tribunale di Rovigo (District Court, Rovigo) for illegal entry 
or stay, as referred to in Italian legislation. That Court found that illegal stay had been duly proven. 
This offence is according to the Law punishable by a ‘fine of between EUR 5 000 and EUR 10 
000’, which can be replaced by an order for expulsion or home detention. 
Legal provision at issue: Article 8(1) and (4) RD 
Questions addressed by the national court: in the light of the principles of sincere cooperation 
and effectiveness, do Articles 2, 4, 6, 7 and 8 of Directive 2008/115 preclude the possibility that a 
third-country national who is considered by the Member State to be illegally staying there may be 
liable to a fine for which home detention is substituted by way of criminal law sanction, solely as a 
consequence of that person’s illegal entry and stay? What is the impact of Articles 2, 15 and 16 RD 
on the possibility for Member States to enact legislation which provides that a third-country national 
who is considered to be illegally staying there, may be liable to a fine for which an enforceable 
order for expulsion with immediate effect is substituted by way of criminal-law sanction?  
Conclusion: The Court had already had the occasion to state that common standards and procedures 
established by Directive 2008/115 would be undermined if, after establishing that a third‑ country 
national is staying illegally, the Member State were to preface the implementation of the return 
decision, or even the adoption of that decision, with a criminal prosecution which could lead to a 
term of imprisonment during the course of the return procedure. Such a step would risk delaying the 
removal. However, legislation, which provides for a criminal prosecution which can lead to a fine 
which may be substituted by an expulsion order, has markedly different effects from the above-
mentioned legislation providing for a criminal prosecution. The possibility that that criminal 
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prosecution may lead to a fine was considered as not impeding the return procedure established by 
Directive 2008/115.  
As for a fine for which a home detention order may be substituted, Directive 2008/115 precludes 
Member State legislation which allows illegal stays by third-country nationals to be penalised by 
means of a home detention order, unless there is a guarantee that the enforcement of that order must 
come to an end as soon as the physical transportation of the individual concerned out of that 
Member State becomes possible.  
CJEU Judgment: First Chamber, 6 December 2012 
Follow-up national decision: On the basis of that ruling, the Tribunal of Monza (17/12/12) found 
that, in the present criminal case, Art. 10-bis of Legislative Decree 286/1998 combined with 
Articles 53 and 55 of Legislative Decree 274/2000 did not comply with Directive 2008/115/EC, 
since the current sanctions system in Italy hinders, in practice, the return procedure and the effective 
return policy of irregular migrants. The Judge called, therefore, for the obligation to disregard 
domestic law in conflict with EU law, because the sole fact that they stayed illegally on the Italian 
territory could not be legally seen as a crime.  
See further http://www.altrodiritto.unifi.it/ricerche/migranti/genovese/cap2.htm#195 (IT only) 
 C-522/11, Mbaye, CJEU Judgment of 21 March 2013 
National court requesting a preliminary ruling: Giudice di pace di Lecce (Italy, Justice of the 
Peace of Lecce)  
Factual context: proceedings brought against Mr Mbaye concerning his illegal stay in Italy. This 
case, among others, has been referred to the CJEU concerning the imprisonment of third-country 
nationals in return procedures for the crime of irregular entry or stay.  
Legal provision at issue: Article 2(2)(b) and 8 RD 
Questions addressed by the national court: Does the Directive 2008/115 preclude the application 
of the present legislation – Article 10bis of legislative Decree286/1998 – punishing irregular entry 
and stay by immediate expulsion? Additionally, are penal sanctions for the irregular presence of a 
third-country national on the territory, admissible in the meaning of the Return Directive, regardless 
of a fully achieved return procedure established by the said directive? 
Conclusion: The Directive 2008/115 does not preclude the legislation of a Member State, such as that 
at issue in the main proceedings, sanctioning the illegal residence of third-country nationals by a fine 
which can be replaced by expulsion. However, this replacement is only used when the applicant’s 
situation corresponds to one of those referred to in Article 7, paragraph 4, of this Directive. 
CJEU Judgment: (Third Chamber) of 21 March 2013, FR (and IT version) 
Follow-up national decision: The Sagor jurisprudence is here confirmed by the CJEU and followed by 
Highest Italian Courts: the Return Directive does not preclude either the criminalization of irregular 
immigration, or the possibility of conducting criminal trials against the TCN, if these might lead to 
pecuniary penalties. This might be replaced by the punishment of ‘immediate expulsion’, provided that 
the act of expulsion remains within the limits of Art. 7, par. 4, Directive. On 19 April 2010, the referring 
Judge also asked the Constitutional Court whether Article 10bis of Legislative Decree 286/98 was 
compatible with the Italian Constitution (http://www.personaedanno.it/aspetti-penali/g-d-p-lecce-19-
aprile-2010-est-c-rochira-il-reato-di-clandestinita-in-odore-di-incostituzionalita-s-c IT only).  
The Constitutional Court confirmed that the provision concerned was not invalid and does not prevent 
Italian authorities from imposing criminal sentences on immigrants irregularly entering and/or staying 
in Italy (e.g. Corte Costituzionale, judgment 250/2010, 05 July 2010) 
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 C-297/12, Filev & Osmani, CJEU Judgment of 19 September 2013 
National court requesting a preliminary ruling: Amtsgericht Laufen (Germany)  
Factual context: criminal proceedings brought against Mr Filev and Osmani, nationals, 
respectively, of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and of the Republic of Serbia, 
following their entry into Germany more than five years after their expulsion from that country, in 
breach of entry bans of unlimited duration which were coupled with the expulsion orders made 
against them. 
Legal provision at issue: Article 11(2) RD 
Questions addressed by the national court: In short, the referring court asked the CJEU whether 
criminal sanctions imposed for the breach of an unlimited entry ban are precluded by Article 11(2) 
of Directive 2008/115/EC, which requires that ‘the length of the entry ban shall be determined with 
due regard to all relevant circumstances of the individual case and shall not in principle exceed five 
years. It may however exceed five years if the third-country national represents a serious threat to 
public policy, public security or national security.’ 
Conclusion: First, Directive 2008/115/EC precludes a provision of national law, such as in the 
present case, which makes the limitation of the length of an entry ban subject to the making by the 
relevant third-country national of an application seeking to obtain the benefits of such a limit. 
Second, Article 11(2) RD precludes the breach of an entry and a residence ban in the territory of a 
Member State, which was handed down more than five years before the date either of the re-entry 
into that territory of the third-country national concerned or of the entry into force of the national 
legislation implementing that directive, from giving rise to a criminal sanction, unless that national 
constitutes a serious threat to public order, public security or national security. 
CJEU Judgment: (Fourth Chamber) of 19 September 2013 
Follow-up national decision: Already before the CJEU’s decision, the Italian Court of Cassation 
disregarded Art. 13, co. 13 of Legislative Decree 286/1998 which notably provided for time-limits 
of entry bans of up to ten years, which clearly contradicted the Directive’s provisions (Cass., I sess. 
crim., sent. n. 8181/2011; Cass., I sess. crim., sent. n. 12220/2012; Cass., I sess. crim., sent. n. 
14276/2012; Cass. I sess. crim. sent. n. 94/2012). 
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 C-290/14, Skerdjan Celaj, CJEU Judgment of 1 October 2015 
Request for a preliminary ruling: Tribunale di Firenze (Italy, Tribunal of Florence) 
Factual context: Mr Celaj, an Albanian national, was arrested by the Italian authorities for entering 
Italian territory in breach of a three year entry ban established within a previous return procedure.  
Legal provision at issue: Article 11(1) RD 
Questions addressed by the national court: the national court wanted to know whether national 
criminal legislation sanctioning re-entry to Italian territory in breach of previous entry ban could be 
considered a criminal offence and so be automatically sanctioned with a criminal penalty of 
imprisonment of up to four years (in casu, eight months), when it has not been the subject of 
coercive measures established within the remit of the removal procedure (Article 8 RD). The 
irregular TCN would be removed only after detention had been executed. According to the defence 
lawyer and the Tribunal of Firenze, the relevant criminal legal provision (Art. 13 (13) D.l.vo 1998 n. 
286) would be contrary to the effet utile of the Return Directive that aims to ensure an effective 
return of irregular TCNs. 
Conclusion: The AG sided with the referring court in finding that the Return Directive is applicable 
to the facts of the case, since an irregular stay was at issue, irrespective of previous re-entry, and 
that automatic detention does not serve the objective of the Return Directive. The CJEU, though, 
took a different view. The CJEU held that the Return Directive does not preclude Member States 
from adopting legislation which lays down criminal law sanctions for the unlawful re-entry of a 
third-country national. (para. 25) Therefore, illegally staying third-country nationals for whom the 
application of the return procedure resulted in their being returned and who then re-enter the 
territory of a Member State in breach of an entry ban are not covered by the Return Directive. 
Nevertheless, the imposition of a criminal law sanction, such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings, is admissible only on the condition that the entry ban issued against that national 
complies with Article 11 of that Directive, a matter which is for the referring court to 
determine. (para. 31) 
‘The imposition of such a criminal law sanction is moreover subject to full observance both of 
fundamental rights, particularly those guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and, as the case may 
be, of the Geneva Convention, in particular Article 31(1) thereof.’ (para. 32) 
CJEU Judgment: (Fourth Chamber) of 1 October 2015 
REDIAL Blog: DI PASCALE A., RENAUDIERE G., AG’s Opinion in Celaj: Lost in 
‘Crimmigration’?, 22 June 2015 
Follow-up national decision: Following the preliminary ruling, the Tribunal of Firenze approved 
the criminal sanction of eight months established by the Prefect of Firenze. The referring court 
closely followed the preliminary reference of the CJEU, although it disagreed with the interpretation 
given by the Court of Justice. This is evident from the reasoning and explanations provided in the 
addressed preliminary reference.  
(for a full account of the addressed preliminary reference, see 
http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/upload/1403269765Rinvio%20pregiudiziale%20alla%20Corte
%20Europea.pdf only in IT) 
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III. Landmark National Case-Law Related to the Termination of Illegal Stay (Chapter 
II Of The Return Directive) 
Article 7 (1) RD: Voluntary Departure (principle) 
According to the Return Directive, the expulsion of an irregular migrant has to follow the strict 
return procedure provided for by the Directive. The return must be enforced first by granting voluntary 
departure to the foreigner, between seven and 30 days (extendable under certain conditions). The 
Member States have to give priority to voluntary departure of TCNs against removal or other 
forced/coercive return measures. The voluntary departure period is usually provided in the return 
decision or the removal order (for those Member States with a one-step procedure), and it thus 
constitutes a first step in the return procedure. 
 The Mandatory Nature of Voluntary Return 
Although the Return Directive has been in force since 2011, certain jurisdictions have not 
transposed the specific procedure and terminology introduced by the RD. For instance, in Spain, there 
is no return decision as such. Instead, every denial of residence permit includes the demand that the 
TCN departs within fifteen days. A TCN identified for the first time as staying irregularly in the 
country, with no other negative circumstances being identified, is not issued with a return decision but, 
rather, a financial sanction. This practice has been reviewed by the Spanish Supreme Court, which 
found these provisions to be incompatible with the RD (judgment of 13 March 2013 (STS 
988/2013). It consequently required national courts to follow the EU return procedure. This strictly 
requires the Member States to sanction the TCNs illegally present in the country with a return 
decision, and gives preference to the voluntary departure measure as a first step before any coercive 
enforcement of removal. The solution reached by the Spanish Supreme Court was later endorsed by 
the CJEU in the Zaizoune judgment. 
The only margin of discretion permitted to the Member States over the TCN’s right to voluntary 
departure is to make that right subject to an individual application by the TCN instead of ex officio 
consideration of granting this measure. If the Member States use this option, they have to conform to 
certain procedural safeguards, including the translation of the administrative decision on voluntary 
departure. Italy is one of the Member States that has taken advantage of this option, and national 
courts have reviewed whether the administration has complied with procedural safeguards while 
exercising this permitted margin of manoeuvre. The Corte di Cassazione (Italian Supreme Court) 
assessed whether national authorities can use a widely-spoken language, instead of the TCN’s mother 
tongue, for the translation of the administrative decision on voluntary departure. The common practice 
in Italy would be the use of multilingual information sheets for the translation of the return decision 
including for voluntary departure. The Corte di Cassazione recalled the principle it established in 
relation to the removal order: if it is ‘impossible’ to translate the removal order in a given language 
then it is legitimate to use one of the most widely spoken languages (e.g. English, French, etc.) (Corte 
di Cassazione, decision no. 1809/2014) 
In spite of the clear legislative requirement to consider voluntary departure as the first measure in 
ensuring the enforcement of the obligation to return of the irregular TCN, confirmed also by the 
CJEU’s jurisprudentially developed requirements for ‘gradualism’ and ‘voluntariness’ in the return 
procedure, national courts were initially reluctant to consider the refusal of voluntary departure as a 
criterion of legality for the return (expulsion) decision. For instance, until recently the Italian Corte di 
Cassazione considered it irrelevant that a term for voluntary departure had not been granted. It was 
affirmed that the rules on the granting of a term for voluntary departure do not affect the legality of the 
expulsion order itself, which must be assessed only in the light of the fact that the legal requirements 
are met. These legal requirements referred only to breaches of the norms on entry and stay and the 
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circumstance of representing a social danger. While voluntary departure was considered to be part of 
the execution of the expulsion, and thus could not play a role in the evaluation of legality of the 
decision of expulsion. (Corte di Cassazione, 10243/2012 and 15185/2012). Following the judgment 
of the Corte di Cassazione (437/2014), the level of protection of access to courts for TCNs has 
increased. The Refusal to grant voluntary departure has been admitted as a point of appeal, as has the 
period for VD, as well as other aspects of this measure in any challenge against the return decision. In 
conclusion, it seems that the conferral of voluntary departure is increasingly considered by Italian 
courts, as a pre-requisite for the assessment of the return decision’s legality. (Italian Report, p. 7) 
 Starting Point of the Voluntary Departure Period 
The starting point of the voluntary departure period is not established expressis verbis in the Return 
Directive. On this issue, the Administrative Court of Appeal of Paris (France) clarified that if the TCN is 
subject to criminal sanctions, the VD period can start only after the fulfilment of those sanctions. (CAA 
Paris, 22/03/2013, no. 12PA03710, see more in the French Report). The Voivodeship Administrative 
Court in Warsaw (Poland) stated that the VD period starts to run from the moment the expulsion 
decision becomes final. That is after the final judgment was delivered in appeal, or after the expiry of the 
appeal period, which itself is considered to run from the date of receipt of the return decision. Therefore, 
the Polish Court stressed that the decision on expulsion cannot lead to immediate removal. (Wojewódzki 
Sąd Administracyjny w Warszawie, IV SA/Wa 2918/12 – WSA, 25/03/2013) 
Article 7 (2): Extension of the Voluntary Departure Period 
According to Article 7(2) RD, Member States have an obligation to extend the period for VD 
beyond the 30 days maximum period when certain ‘specific circumstances of the individual case’ are 
met. The paragraph sets out a non-exhaustive list of three such circumstances, namely: the length of 
stay; children attending school; and other family and social links. The RD allows the Member States to 
extend this list of prolongation grounds to other situations related to the ‘specific circumstances of the 
individual case’. Conditions related to the vulnerability of the TCN (e.g. medial situations, or family 
situations) have usually been considered by national courts to be legitimate additional grounds 
justifying the prolongation of the VD period. The Austrian High Administrative Court (2012/21/0072, 
16.5.2013) clarified the scope of the ‘specific circumstances of the individual case’, as including also 
‘circumstances in the target country’ and not only those in the Member State(s). The Court stated that 
circumstances in Austria play a role but also ‘circumstances in the country of origin’. For instance, the 
fact that the TCNs concerned were not able to return to their country of origin in winter, because there 
was no place there to live with (adequate) heating was taken into account; as was the fact that their son 
was born in Austria and that he was not registered in Byelorussia. The VD period was subsequently 
extended. This particular interpretation of the concept of the ‘specific circumstances of the individual 
case’ given by the Austrian High Administrative Court was endorsed also by the Commission in its 
Return Handbook. This indicates that the term ‘where necessary’ refers to circumstances both in 
the sphere of the returnee and in the sphere of the returning State. (Return Handbook, p. 36.) 
The pregnancy of a TCN’s wife is commonly taken into consideration by national courts among 
family and social circumstance (e.g. Austria, Belgium, and France). On the other hand, ongoing 
divorce procedures are not considered a valid reason (CAA Nantes, 26/02/2015). Organising travel 
documentation is taken into consideration in a few jurisdictions, however on a case-by-case basis, and 
not generally. When considering the legitimacy of the grounds invoked for VD prolongation, certain 
national courts pay attention to the issue of whether the application submitted by the TCN is abusive 
or not. For instance, according to the Higher Administrative Court of Northrhine-Westfalia 
(Germany, 18 B 779/15, 23.07.2015), the request for prolongation needs to be assessed, whether it is 
truly aiming at arranging the return, or whether it rather aims to legalise the claimant’s stay (e.g. return 
of the wife/partner with children). 
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One of the main problems concerning the extension of the VD period is that, unlike the first 
paragraph of Article 7, the second paragraph does not set out a fixed timeframe for the extension of 
the VD period. This thus leaves a considerable margin of discretion to the Member States on 
establishing the extension period. National courts approved prolongation periods ranging from one 
year in cases of TCNs with children attending school, to the period covering pregnancy plus eight 
weeks after birth (Federal Administrative Court, G307 2013610-1, 24.2.2015, see the Austrian 
Report), to a suitable period for post-surgery recuperation (Austrian Federal Administrative Court, 
W196 2015947-1, 28.1.2015). 
Article 7 (3): Obligations pending Voluntary Departure 
Article 7(3) RD provides for certain obligations which should minimize the risk of irregular TCNs 
absconding during the voluntary departure period. These obligations include: 1) regular reporting to 
the authorities; 2) the deposit of an adequate financial guarantee; and/or 3) submission of documents 
or the obligation to stay at a certain place. They can be imposed only for ‘avoiding the risk of 
absconding’. Requiring certain obligations to be fulfilled by the TCN concerned is an alternative to the 
more stringent decision to shorten the VD period to less than seven days or even immediately 
removing the TCN. According to the CJEU, this gradualism in establishing the appropriate return 
measure should be followed by national authorities and courts when a risk of absconding is identified. 
(El Dridi, para. 41) 
A positive evolution in the application of the principle of gradualism can be seen in certain national 
jurisdictions. For instance, national courts scrutinise the failure of the administrative authorities to 
adequately consider the possibility of imposing one or multiple obligations as an alternative prior to a 
coercive removal order. The lack of adequate reasons given by the authorities to refuse a period for 
VD, with attached obligations prior to giving a removal order, has been interpreted by national courts 
as a legitimate ground for quashing the administrative order for removal (Czech Republic, France). 
Furthermore, national courts reject general statements, such as, ‘there is no integration in Austrian 
society or legal order’, as legitimate grounds proving a risk of absconding (see Federal 
Administrative Court, G307 2009115-1/2E, 28.7.2014, see the Austrian Report). 
Article 7 (4): Shortening or Refusing Voluntary Departure Period 
Pursuant to Article 7(4) RD, Member States may, under certain circumstances, grant a period 
shorter than seven days or refuse to grant a period for voluntary departure. The specific circumstances 
when Member States may derogate from the general obligation of granting a VD period are 
exhaustively set out by that provision: if there is a risk of absconding, if an application for a legal stay 
has been dismissed as manifestly unfounded or fraudulent, or if the TCN concerned poses a risk to 
public policy, public security or national security. The RD does not, however, provide an exhaustive 
definition of these circumstances, such as the situations that would qualify to demonstrate these risks. 
The RD limits itself to providing general indications that the Member States have to respect when they 
implement EU law. The national transposition measures, on the other hand, have significantly 
expanded the notion of the ‘risk of absconding’ as well as the ‘risk to public policy’. 
It seems that the majority of the national cases related to voluntary departure deal with the issue of 
the legitimacy and/or the proportionality of the administrative refusal to grant VD on the basis of the 
grounds of ‘risk of absconding’, ‘risk to public policy’ or ‘abusive applications for the legalisation of 
the TCNs stay in the Member State(s)’. 
 Risk of Absconding 
The ‘risk of absconding’ is in general understood, for return procedures, to have the meaning that 
the migrant will seek to obstruct his/her return if set free, mainly by disappearing. 
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Bulgaria and the Czech Republic did not transpose the ‘risk of absconding’ as a ground for 
justifying refusal of VD. In light of this legislative gap, the Czech Supreme Court has recently sent a 
preliminary request to the CJEU seeking to obtain an answer on how to interpret the national legislation 
to ensure conformity with the relevant EU law (CJEU, C-528/15, Al Chodor e.a.). 
When no objective criteria are set by national legislation (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Greece, 
and Hungary), they are usually set by the administration and the judiciary follows them closely. 
However, as CJEU jurisprudence requires respect of the principle of gradualism and proportionality in 
choosing the appropriate return related measure and individual assessment of the facts of each return 
case, national courts have increasingly extended their scope of review over administration decisions 
establishing the risk of absconding. There seems to be an ascending jurisprudential trend whereby 
courts no longer accept as justified the automatic finding of a risk of absconding by the administration 
(see, in particular, the Austrian, Czech and French courts). Furthermore, national courts pay closer 
attention to the principle of proportionality when deciding the consequences of finding a risk of 
absconding: these include, establishing VD with attached obligations; limiting the VD period; refusing 
VD; and adopting a removal order, or detention (in particular, Austria, Bulgaria, and Czech 
Republic, see inter alia, Judgement of the SAC of 30 September 2014, No. 9 Azs 192/2014, § 22). 
The following is a non-exhaustive list of situations that are commonly considered by the national 
authorities, including national courts, as falling within the scope of the ‘risk of absconding’: false 
information on identity document; providing false information; refusing to communicate; having forged, 
falsified or used another name for a residence permit or an ID or travel document; use of false or 
misleading information or false or falsified documents when applying for a residence permit or recourse 
to fraud or other illegal means to obtain the right to stay; no documents proving accommodation where 
s/he can be easily found; no effective or permanent place of residence; showing a lack of cooperation in 
the return procedures; non-compliance with voluntary departure; violation of the obligations imposed 
with the aim of avoiding the risk of absconding during the voluntary departure period; previous 
absconding; non-compliance with an alternative measure to detention; clear unwillingness to comply 
with the imposed measure; statements made indicate the likelihood of absconding; and violation of an 
entry ban. This is a long list of possible situations that are taken to justify a ‘risk of absconding’. 
Therefore the list of circumstances justifying refusal of VD is quite long. National courts seem to 
gradually challenge this wide definition of the ‘risk of absconding’ and particularly the lack of concrete 
and individual assessments of the cases by the administrative authorities. 
The automatic consideration of these circumstances as proof of to prove a risk of absconding has 
been increasingly rejected by national courts (TA Lille, 22 Jul. 2011, No. 1104137; CAA Bordeaux, 
April 3 2012, No. 11CX02996; Dutch Council of State, 10 July 2014, 201309038/1/V1). The French 
judge considered that the administrative authorities are obliged to carry out an individual assessment of 
the particular circumstances of the case in light of his obligation to ensure respect of the principle of 
proportionality between the proposed measures and the pursued objective, especially when coercive 
measures are proposed. (CAA Paris, 1 ch., May 310, 2013, No. 12PA03323) Other national courts also 
reject general statements deprived of concrete factual references to individual situations (‘there is no 
integration in Austrian society or legal order’) justifying the existence of a risk of absconding. (Federal 
Administrative Court, G307 2009115-1/2E, 28.7.2014, see the Austrian Report). 
The Council for Aliens’ Law Litigation of Belgium (CALL) is closely scrutinising the 
circumstances of the case, finding different results depending on the concrete circumstances of the 
case. For instance, in one case the absence of an official address in Belgium was considered sufficient 
proof of a risk of absconding, justifying a refusal to grant a voluntary departure. (CALL, 97 083, 
13.02.2013) In a different case, CALL took a different decision. It suspended the order to leave the 
territory and ordered the Aliens Office to take into consideration the fact that the applicant lived with 
his wife and two children, who reside legally in Belgium, and that this spoke against a risk of 
absconding, unlike the previous case. A family seems to be widely considered as a guarantee that there 
is no risk of absconding. For instance, the Administrative Court of Appeal of Nantes found that the 
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fact that a TCN had not lawfully entered French territory and had failed to obtain a residence permit 
was not sufficient evidence to establish a risk of absconding, and a refusal of VD. The fact that the 
TCN concerned had been married to a French national with whom she continued to live, during which 
time she lost her passport, but aimed to regularise her stay in France, was sufficient evidence for the 
Court. It judged that the administration committed a manifest error of assessment. It consequently 
annulled the decision and decided to confer VD with residence assigned at the place where she was 
staying with her husband (CAA Nantes, 31 May 2012, 11NT03061). 
However, a family is not always considered a guarantee against a TCN absconding. The fact that an 
alien had already withdrawn from the implementation of two removal orders and that he had opposed 
return during hearing by police forces was considered important. It overrode the fact that the applicant 
had a permanent address and his children enrolled in a school (CAA Paris, 1 ch., May 31, 2013, No. 
12PA03883). The risk of a TCN absconding is presumed also in cases where, the alien evaded a 
previous deportation, in spite of mitigating circumstances such as wedding plans and good social 
conducts, proven by his involvement in voluntary activities (CAA Paris, November 14, 2013, No. 
13PA00122, see French report). If the TCN has counterfeited, forged or procured under a different name 
than his or her own residence permit(s) or identity or travel documents, national courts would usually 
presume a risk of absconding, justifying refusal of VD, even if there are other mitigating circumstances. 
There seems to be a lack of uniform interpretation of the effects attached to the objective criteria 
justifying the establishment of a ‘risk of absconding’. It is interesting to note that lack of passport or 
residence permit is considered by several Member States as grounds justifying the risk of absconding 
on the part of a TCN. However, while in certain Member States this situation alone is commonly 
considered to be enough to establish certain obligations during the VD period (Netherlands), in other 
Member States it was considered sufficient by the administration and courts to justify detention (!). In 
the case of Re. Rita Kumah, a Cypriot court found ‘that detention is necessary for as long as there is a 
risk of absconding and there is a risk of absconding in this case because the applicant did not have a 
passport or a residence permit’ (Re the application of Rita Kumah, Supreme Court, Civil application 
No. 198/2013, 29 November 2013, see also the Cypriot Report, p. 6). 
 Risk to Public Policy 
The RD does not provide a definition, even a general definition of the risk to public policy as it does 
in the case of the risk of absconding. In a judgment delivered by the CJEU on 11 June 2015, the Court 
clarified the meaning of the ‘risk to public policy’ (Z. Zh. and O., C-554/13, see Part I for more 
information). Member States are precluded from relying on general practices or assumptions in order to 
determine the existence of such a risk. Instead they are required to asses, on a case-by-case basis, 
whether the personal conduct of a given TCN poses a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat for 
fundamental social interests, in addition to the perturbation of the social order which any infringement of 
the law involves (see paras. 50 and 60). Suspicion that the TCN has committed a criminal offence or 
even an established criminal offence cannot ‘justify findings that that (TCN) poses a risk to public policy 
within the meaning of Article 7(4) of Directive 2008/115.’ (para. 60) Other factors, such as the nature 
and seriousness of that act, the time which has elapsed since it was committed and any matter which 
relates to the reliability of the suspicion that the TCN committed a criminal offence is also relevant for a 
case-by-case assessment, which needs to be carried out. (para. 65). 
Grounds such as criminal convictions or suspicion of criminal conviction were, previous to the Z. 
Zh. And O. judgment, commonly considered as falling under the ‘risk of absconding’ and could 
automatically lead to refusal of VD (e.g. Cyprus, Belgium, Spain, Germany – Administrative Court 
of Augsburg, Au 6 K 12.667, 16-01-2013). For instance, the Immigration Appeals Board of Malta 
(IAB, judgment of 25.03.2013) held that the criminal punishment of imprisonment for one year gives 
legitimate grounds for refusing VD and ordering removal. 
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Bulgaria as well as the Czech Republic did not include the risk of absconding among the 
legitimate grounds for shortening or refusing to confer VD. They refer, however, to the risk to public 
policy as grounds for refusing the VD period. The Bulgarian Law on Foreign Nationals, Article 39b 
(4), reads that a period for voluntary departure shall not be granted when the foreign national ‘poses a 
threat to the national security or the public order’. Therefore, national courts have had to review 
whether certain facts considered by other national courts as falling under the ‘risk of absconding’ 
justify the existence of a ‘risk to public policy’. In the case of Salar Zangenhe, the Bulgarian 
Supreme Administrative Court (decision of 10 January 2011, 5673/2010) considered the lack of valid 
documents as sufficient proof to establish a risk to public policy. In casu, Mr. Zangenhe had just 
entered Bulgaria irregularly and had no personal identification documents. At the interview, he stated 
that his ultimate goal was to reach the United Kingdom. In view of this fact, the Court found that a 
period for voluntary compliance in the return order was pointless and therefore, in this specific case, 
not granting a period for voluntary departure was not a ‘substantial’ violation of the law. However, 
there was no evident proof of the TCN refusal to return as in the Zangenhe case (Hossam Eldin, 
judgment of the same court, 07 March 2012, 6339/2011). In other cases, the same Court held that 
the absence of valid identification documents cannot justify the refusal to grant VD, but at most the 
attachment of obligations to be fulfilled pending voluntary departure. 
 Application for a legal stay has been dismissed as manifestly unfounded or fraudulent 
A third ground provided by Article 7(4) RD as justifying the shortening or refusal of VD consists 
of the dismissal of the application submitted by a third country-national as manifestly unfounded or 
fraudulent. The effect of abusive applications, on the return procedure, has been assessed by the Dutch 
Council of State (in a judgment of 12.04.2012, 201102602/1/V2). The applicant was rejected the 
renewed asylum application in an accelerated procedure and by this same administrative decision he 
was forced to return without any period of voluntary departure. On appeal to the judgment of the 
District Court in The Hague, the Council of State was asked to review the conformity of the 
administrative decision with Article 7 RD. The applicant argued that Dutch legislation allowing the 
rejection of a residence permit for a certain time, such as the rejection of an asylum application in an 
accelerated procedure, without allowing for a period between 7 and 30 days of voluntary departure, is 
contrary to Article 7 of the RD which requires the Member States to grant a VD period, except in 
certain precise circumstances which do not apply in the case at hand. The Ministry argued that the 
decision to reject the residence permit for a certain period of time and order expulsion immediately 
was justified on the basis of Article 28(2) of the Asylum Procedure Directive 2005/85 and Article 7(4) 
RD which mentions as grounds for VD refusal the ‘application for a legal stay has been dismissed as 
manifestly unfounded or fraudulent’. The Council of State first highlighted that at the time of the 
administrative decision – 26.02.2011, Netherlands had not implemented Article 7 of the RD. The 
Council held that the applicant can nevertheless rely directly on Article 7 RD since, on the basis of the 
Becker judgment of the CJEU, individuals are able to rely directly on provisions of EU Directives, 
after the period of implementation has expired when they are ‘unconditional and sufficiently precise’. 
Thus Article 7(1) and (4) RD were held to be directly effective by the Council of State. Secondly the 
Council rejected the argument that the Ministry had been justified in refusing VD on the basis of 
Article 28(2) AP Directive and Article 7(4) RD, since, the legislator had chosen not to implement 
Article 28, par 2 of the Asylum Procedures Directive (2005/85) in Dutch legislation. Therefore, 
according to CJEU jurisprudence (judgement of 21 October 2010, C-227/09, Accardo, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:624, paragraphs 46 en 47) the derogating provisions in question cannot be relied on 
directly by the authorities against individuals, for the purpose of denying TCNs a period for voluntary 
departure. The Council of State quashed the first instance court’s judgment and annulled the 
administrative decision of 26 January 2011 on grounds that it contained a return decision, which 
lacking a VD period, was contrary to Article 7 of the RD. 
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Article 8 RD – Removal 
 ‘Criminalisation’ of Irregular Stay  
Although Article 8 RD only refers to administrative measures (coercive or not) contributing to the 
‘carrying through of the removal which the return procedure is intended to achieve’, it does not 
preclude Member States from laying down penal sanctions for infringements of migration rules or 
from defining, in domestic law, which types of infringements are ‘criminalised’.2  
In Slovenia, the Supreme Court reminded that punishment procedures for illegal stay are neither 
related nor inter-connected to the removal process. Whether or not an applicant is found guilty of 
illegally staying in the Republic of Slovenia is not relevant as a pre-condition or a requirement for the 
issuance of a removal decision from the Administrative Court. (Supreme Court of the Republic of 
Slovenia, X Ips 413/2012 (02/2014). 
With regard to financial penalties, it is striking to note that from 2005 to 2013, the Spanish 
Supreme and High Courts applied, as an administrative practice, the imposition of criminal sanctions, 
either a fine or an expulsion, to migrants staying in Spain irregularly, depending on the existence of 
aggravating circumstances (most of them taken from Spanish case law). Negative factors, leading to 
‘expulsion’ instead of financial penalties included: the lack of documentation of the TCN, previous 
criminal detentions, non-compliance with a previous return decision etc. 
After the CJEU rendered its decision in Zaizoune, as requested by the High Court of the 
Autonomous Community of the Basque Country (High Court of Justice of the Autonomous 
Community of the Basque Country, 2014/C 93/32 (2013)), the ‘doctrine of the fine’ changed as 
follows: a fine can no longer be imposed as a criminal sentence to be used as an alternative to removal, 
in the absence of aggravating circumstances. However, as a way to continue to ‘circumvent’ removal 
in specific circumstances, administrative Spanish High Courts rely either on Articles 5 and 6 RD to 
prevent the enforcement of removal when the principle of non-refoulement and the best interest of the 
child are at stake (Tribunal Superior de Murcia, Sala de lo Contencioso-Administrativo, STSJ 
791/2015 (09/2015)) – or reduce the length of entry-bans, from 3 to 2 years (Tribunal Superior de 
Justicia de Castilla y Leòn, Valladolid, Sala de lo Contencioso-Administrativo, STSJ 967/2015 
(2015)) or to 1 year, in a case where the TCN was only ‘guilty’ of performing a non-authorized 
activity (Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla y León, Valladolid, Sala de lo Contencioso-
Administrativo, STSJ 966/2015 (2015)). 
With regard to prison sentences, several national Courts adapted their case-law (usually in line with 
changes in the practice and/or the legislation) in order to better comply with the Return Directive and 
its objective of effectiveness. In France, the Court of Cassation officially endorsed, with its Advisory 
Opinion, the abolishment of the former practice of police custody during the course or before the 
engagement of the return procedure (Advisory opinion from the Court of Cassation, 9002 
(06/2012)). The Czech Supreme Court stated, however, that suspended prison sentences were 
admissible since a previous return decision (here accompanied by a two-year entry ban) had failed in 
forcing a foreign national to leave the territory. Indeed, from the Court’s point of view, the fact that 
the prison sentence was suspended was likely to persuade the TCN not to stay illegally in the Czech 
Republic, while allowing him to comply with the return decision by leaving the country at short 
notice. (Nejvyšší soud (Supreme Court), 7 Tdo 500/2014 (05/2014)).  
Finally, with regard to moment that criminal imprisonment can be resorted to, Member States 
interpret differently the concept of a return procedure ‘achieved’ or ‘applied’: see, for example, the 
                                                     
2 Seeking to ensure the proper implementation of the Return Directive while complying with Member States’ competencies, 
the Court of Justice has been several times called upon to clarify the scope of EU Law applying to ‘irregular’ third-
country nationals subject to criminal proceedings. 
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CJEU in Achughbabian. Whereas the Dutch Council of State establishes, in a landmark case, the 
conditions to be met before resorting to criminal sentences (Hoge Raad der Nederlanden, 11/0307 
(05/2013)) namely when all the steps of the return procedure have been applied (Supreme Court, 
12/05522 (12/2013)), the Czech Supreme Court seems to suggest that imprisonment becomes 
admissible when the TCN fails to comply with the return decision and the subsequent administrative 
measures taken against him (yet without specifying which ones) (Nejvyšší soud (Supreme Court), 7 
Tdo 500/2014 (05/2014)).
3
 
 Coercive Nature of the Removal 
Although not explicitly stated in Article 8 RD, the question as to whether the removal corresponds 
to a ‘forced’ return, implying coercion from the States’ authorities, has been raised by different 
national High Courts. This was notably addressed and answered affirmatively by the Dutch Council of 
State, in a landmark case, July 2009 (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State 
(Council of State), 200902298-1-V3 (07/2009)). The Council of State also pointed out that as soon as 
the return is made on a ‘voluntary basis’, which is the case for escorted departures by IOM, there is no 
coercive removal so that administrative detention is excluded. (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de 
Raad van State (Council of State), 201401757/1/V3 (04/2014)). Similarly, before forcibly returning 
someone to a third-country destination, the Administrative Court of Hamburg in Germany stressed 
that preference should be given to voluntary ‘departure’ to another EU Member State, from which a 
valid residence permit has been issued, in accordance with Article 6(2) RD. (Administrative Court of 
Hamburg, 17 K 1758/14 (01/2015)).  
 Proportionality Assessment 
In accordance to Article 8(4) RD, read in conjunction with Recitals 13 and 16, any ‘coercive’ 
action or measure taken during the course of the return procedure ‘should be expressly subject to the 
principles of proportionality and effectiveness with regard to the means used and objectives pursued’. 
In Germany the very decision to remove has to be proportionate and must admit exceptions 
depending on the circumstances of the case. For instance, if required by the TCN’s strong family ties, 
removal – here accompanied by an entry-ban – can be replaced by a softer option such as a new-time 
limit for voluntary departure (Verwaltungsgericht Hamburg (Administrative Court of Hamburg), 
15 E 2900/13 (07/2013)). With regard to the modalities of its enforcement, the Bulgarian Supreme 
Administrative Court interprets the principle of proportionality more broadly, as preventing authorities 
from forcibly removing a TCN against whom an order has been issued more than five years earlier. 
This does not need to take into account either potential changes in the TCN’s situation, nor the 
existence of legal grounds as of the date of serving. (Върховен административен съд (The 
Supreme Administrative Court court), 3366/2011 (06/2012)).  
Finally, even if enforced, related measures aimed at carrying out the removal of a third-country 
national, who resists removal, must also be proportionate. According to the Dutch Council of State, 
when handcuffs are not required or necessary in the removal process (e.g. police cars already provided 
with cells), ‘security’ measures like this cannot be justified ((Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de 
Raad van State (Council of State), 201102621/1/V3 (03/2012)). A posteriori, the Austrian 
Administrative Court considers that the enforcement of the return decision (Ndlr. removal is not a 
distinct decision from the former in Austria) is specifically subject to a distinct judicial review. This 
implies an assessment of its proportionality. In this respect, a return decision can be considered as 
                                                     
3 Such controversy has, nevertheless, been solved by the ECJ in its recent judgment Celaj for re-entry in breach of pending 
entry bans, not precluding in principle the possibility that Member States adopt legislation which lays down criminal law 
sanctions, including imprisonment, in such particular circumstances (See section 1.a. and 2). 
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lawful, while a subsequent removal is not. (Verwaltungsgerichtshof (High Administrative Court), 
2010/21/0056 (10/2011)).  
 Necessity of Pre-removal Measures  
The principle according to which measures used by competent authorities in the course of the 
removal process have to be ‘necessary to enforce the return decision’ – as provided for by Article 8(1) 
RD and the corresponding CJEU case-law seems to be generally agreed upon by Member States’ 
judicial authorities. In Germany, administrative detention has been declared illegal by the Federal 
Court of Justice because it was not used as a pre-removal measure (i.e. to secure physical deportation), 
but, rather, to prepare the expulsion order (i.e. the return decision). Yet the expulsion order is covered 
by a different paragraph of the legal provision ((Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice), V 
ZB 92/12 (07/2013)). Interestingly, the Dutch Council of State also distinguishes real actions (likely 
to lead to the TCN’s deportation) from administrative actions (necessary to go through the 
return/removal process but not in itself ending in deportation). Both kinds of actions are, therefore, 
seen as necessary steps. However, if a TCN has been detained (on the basis of Article 15 RD), 
administrative authorities must act with due diligence and take at least one real action within the first 
days of the person’s detention in order to comply with EU and national law. This is to be appreciated 
by national courts. (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State (Council of State), 
200901758/1/V3 (04/2009)). 
Article 9(2) RD: Postponement of Removal  
Some circumstances are likely, pursuant to Article 9(2) RD, to postpone removal without yet 
affecting the lawfulness of the return decision. In the vast majority of States, postponing or delaying 
the TCN’s removal, for example, for medical reasons or health concerns, does not render the initial 
decision unlawful (NL, Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State (Council of State), 
201404098/1/V2 (12/2014)). On the contrary, it only prevents competent authorities from removing 
the third-country national, not necessarily implying a right to stay or toleration on the territory. This is 
notably the case in the Netherlands for TCNs subject to ‘heavy’ entry bans. (Afdeling 
bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State (Council of State), 201300216/1/V3)). However, after 
a certain period of time, the reasonable prospect of removal, required for the removal to be lawful, 
might disappear. This was the case in France for a woman, who was six months pregnant, and whose 
return had been postponed (Tribunal administrative de Lille, France, 1404924(2014)).  
Article 10(2) RD: Removal of Unaccompanied Minors  
Little case law has been provided by the Member States surveyed, relevant to the removal of 
unaccompanied minors (UM). In Italy, for instance, the main concern related to UM regards age 
assessment and its consequences for the application of the return procedure. But according to Italian 
domestic law, no expulsion of UM takes place (Giudice di Pace di Bologna – Justice of the Peace of 
Bologna, n. 40821/2013 (06/2013)).  
Even before the Return Directive’s implementation, Belgian courts had developed a quite elaborate 
case-law on the removal of UM, mainly relying on the principles of good administration and manifest 
error of appreciation, in order to invalidate the removal when there were not enough ‘adequate 
guarantees’ in the country of reception. (See for instance Council for Aliens’ Law Litigation, 91 
896 (11/2012)). Although not explicitly provided for by the Directive, deportation is suspended de 
facto until the immigration authorities have ensured ‘the concrete fact that a member of the minor’s 
family or another authorized person or institution will receive the minor’. It thus implies that if a 
removal decision is issued, the unaccompanied minor also has the possibility to challenge it before the 
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Courts and to claim a follow-up protection order from the government. (Bundesverwaltungsgericht 
(German Federal Administrative Court), 10 C 13.12 (06/2013)).  
Article 11 RD: Entry Ban 
Article 11(1) RD requires the administration to apply entry bans if the obligation to return has not 
been complied with (a rather objective criteria) or if ‘no period for voluntary departure has been 
granted’.4 This means that the administration must automatically issue an entry ban when it refuses to 
give the third-country national the possibility of leaving the country voluntarily. In this regard, the 
Dutch Council of State goes further, as it considers that the administration can impose an entry ban, 
even if it leaves the third-country national the possibility of departing voluntarily
 
(NL, Afdeling 
bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State (Council of State), 201302843/1/V3). 
The second indent of Article 11(1) indicates that the administration has, for the rest, the possibility 
but not the duty of applying entry bans.  
 Link with a Return Decision 
The Belgian Council for Aliens Law Litigation insists that the entry ban differs from the return 
decision and must, therefore, be the object of a separate motivation
5
 (BE, Raad voor 
Vreemdelingenbetwistingen (Council for Alien Law Litigation), 128.272, 27 August 2014). The 
illegality of the entry ban does not necessarily entail the illegality of the return decision. 
 Nature of Entry Bans 
The French Constitutional Court has elucidated the ‘nature’ of entry bans. This court clearly 
decided it is an administrative measure (‘mesure de police’) and not a criminal sanction. This issue has 
not been the object of case law in other Member States and does not seem to be controversial
 
(Conseil 
Constitutionnel, decision n° 2011-631 DC 09/2011).  
 Type of Entry Bans 
Article 11 of the Return Directive distinguishes between mandatory and optional entry bans. 
Interestingly, the Netherlands made another distinction between what is called in administrative 
practice ‘heavy’ and ‘light’ entry bans. A heavy entry ban relates to the ‘dangerousness’ of the TCN, 
while light entry bans are all the other entry bans taken for another reason. This distinction is 
interesting because it has consequence for the power of the administration. (Dutch Council of State, 
201307320/1/V2, 25 June 2014). 
 Starting Point and Length of Entry Bans 
Article 11, paragraph 2 of the Return Directive foresees that ‘the length of the entry ban shall not in 
principle exceed five years’. It continues by saying that ‘It may however exceed five years if the third-
country national represents a serious threat to public policy, public security or national security’. 
                                                     
4 This refers to Article 7 (4) foreseeing that the administration may refrain from granting a period for voluntary departure or 
shorten it in three cases: risk of absconding; manifestly unfounded or fraudulent application for a legal stay; as well as 
risk to public policy, public security or national security. See European Synthesis Report on Article 7 to 11 RD, 
December 2015. 
5 BE, Raad voor Vreemdelingenbetwistingen (Council for Alien Law Litigation), 128.272, 27 August 2014. 
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Some technical issues have been clarified by the Courts: first of all, the Federal Administrative 
Court of Germany considered that the entry ban must be taken and its length determined 
simultaneously with the expulsion decision (meaning a return decision issued for criminal reasons). 
(See for instance Bundesverwatungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court), BVerwG 1 C 9.12, 
July 2013). Following Article 11 of the Return Directive, the entry ban should accompany the return 
decision. The Supreme Administrative Court of the Czech Republic considered that, in absence of a 
specification, the starting point for the entry ban is the date of the legal force of the return decision and 
not the date of the removal decision. (Rozšířený senát Nejvyššího správního soudu, Grand 
Chamber of the Supreme Administrative Court, Zhao H. v. Ministry of Interior, 1 As 106/2010 
(01/2012). 
As regards the length of the entry ban, the Voivodship Administrative Court in Warsaw (IV 
SA/Wa 2918/12 – WSA (25/03/2013)) held that Article 11(2) RD and the principle of reformation in 
peius principle prohibit the administration from changing the length of the entry ban in appeal from a 
six months period to a one month period following a national legislative amendment. The Court 
agreed with the first administrative authority, which had applied the more favourable provisions of 
Directive 2008/115/EC in place of national legislation. Pursuant to Article 11 paragraph 2 of the 
Directive, and taking into account all the relevant circumstances of the present case, the six-month ban 
was considered sufficient. It was an adequate sanction for the offence committed by the TCN, who did 
not pose a threat to public policy, public security or national security. 
Regarding entry bans for reasons of public policy, public security or national security, a German 
ruling of the Federal Administrative Court of 13 December 2012 is particularly interesting. It 
considered that ten years was a maximum for entry bans because it constitutes the time horizon for 
which a prognosis can realistically be made. This, however, does not mean than an entry ban cannot be 
renewed or that a new entry ban cannot be taken depending on the circumstances. (See for instance 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court), BVerwG 1 C 20.11, (12/2012)). 
 Consequences of Entry Bans 
The geographical scope of entry bans should be clarified as it is not always clear that whether or 
not they are valid for the entire Schengen area.  
Apart from preventing re-entry in case of border checks, the Netherlands and Italy consider that 
re-entry despite a previous entry ban constitutes a criminal offence, beyond simple illegal entry. 
(Tribunale di Firenze – Court of Florence, N. 941/2013, (05/2014)). The CJEU has considered that 
such legislation is not contrary to the Return Directive in the Case Celaj of 1 October 2015. 
Nevertheless the CJEU has been very clear in underlining that national courts have to determine 
whether the issue of the entry ban was carried out in compliance with Article 11 RD, in situations of 
unlawful re-entry. This particular conclusion of the CJEU challenges the Dutch Council of State 
approach which does not require that either before the departure of the TCN concerned, or after his re-
entry, all the steps of the return procedure as laid down in the RD have been applied (Dutch Council 
of State, 4 December 2014, 12/05658). It remains to be seen whether the Dutch Council of State will 
change its jurisprudential approach following the Celaj Judgment. Will there be an examination of 
whether the return procedure has been applied and completed before the national judge can condemn 
the TCN to a prison sentence?  
 Judicial Control of Entry Bans 
Article 11, (2) RD states that ‘the length of the entry ban shall be determined with due regard to all 
relevant circumstances of the individual case’. This is the usual and general criteria that have to be 
applied by the administration when it has the power and not the obligation to apply an entry ban. The 
judge is there to assess how the administration makes use of this discretionary power. 
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In France, this control is made by the administrative judge, checking the motives of the decision in 
relation to the four criteria, foreseen in French legislation for entry bans. The judge will also control 
the necessity of the entry ban and in particular the right to private and family life. However, the French 
judge does not give rules about the adequate length of entry bans contrary to what the German judge 
tried to do (see below). In Spain, there is interestingly a case where the judge diminished the length of 
an entry ban (Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla y León, Valladolid, Sala de lo 
Contencioso-Administrativo, Sección 3ª nº 966/2015). 
The German Federal Administrative Court ruled in February 2012 that there is, for third-country 
nationals, a right to a comprehensive judicial control of the length of time for an entry ban; and that 
there is no longer administrative discretion here (Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal 
Administrative Court) BVerwG, 14 February 2012, 1 C 7.11).  
This provoked the adoption by the German Parliament of a provision confirming the discretionary 
power of the administration regarding the length of entry bans. This includes the possibility for the 
administration to connect the duration of entry bans to substantive conditions like a criminal record or 
its absence. It will not lead to an absence of judicial control for administrative discretion, but to checks 
made on the basis of rules above German legislation, like constitutional and European Union law, 
including the principle of proportionality.  
The German Federal Administrative Court also decided in a judgement of 13 December 2012 that 
this depends on a two-step reasoning: first, ascertaining the weight of the reasons underlying the 
expulsion decision; and second, evaluating whether the duration of the entry ban is compatible with 
the right to private and family life which refers to the traditional balancing exercise, including the 
principle of proportionality. All circumstances in an individual case must be taken into consideration. 
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht (German Federal Administrative Court), 1 C 14.12). 
Belgian case law provides an interesting example with a case where an entry ban was annulled. 
The administration had not taken the care provided by the applicant to her ill aunt into consideration 
(CALL, 26 January 2015, 139.793).  
Austrian jurisprudence, meanwhile, gave weight to the length of the stay in the country, say, ten 
years, even if the person only speaks basic German (High Administrative Court, VwGH 
2012/21/0044, 2.10.2012). Criteria used by administrative courts to determine the length of entry bans 
are: the third-country national trying to prevent the obligation to return; disregard for previous entry 
bans – leading to subsequent illegal stay; and the reimbursement of expenses for previous removals 
that are prescribed by German law. Case law in Belgium illustrates very well the requirement to take 
the right to family life and private life into consideration: for instance, integration in Belgian society 
and the schooling of his children (CALL, 1st August 2013, 107.890). It is interesting to note that the 
Dutch Council of State has ruled that there is no balance of interests to be made by the administration 
for a ‘light’ entry ban contrary to ‘heavy’ entry bans (see above regarding this distinction) (Afdeling 
bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State (Council of State), 201103520/1/V3). 
Judicial control in Cyprus raises serious concerns. Any third-country national, who is returned for 
whatever reason, will be put on a ‘stop list’ that is actually an entry ban. This occurs often without time 
limit but is, in principle, for a maximum of five years. In a recent case of 25 June 2015 involving a 
Lebanese businessman, the judge ruled, after the applicant had contested the ban, that placing a person 
on the stop list is not a judicially reviewable act, save if the applicant can rebut the presumption of initial 
good faith on behalf of the authorities. (Elie Jamil El Khoury v. Republic, 5710/2013, (06/2015).  
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IV. Judicial Interaction on the Return Policy: a European and National Perspective  
This part aims to discuss the various dimensions of judicial interactions on particular aspects 
regarding Chapter II of the Return Directive. The First Part focuses on a three-dimensional dialogue: 
1) between national judges and the CJEU (vertical dialogue); 2) between national judges from the 
same Member States (horizontal dialogue); and 3) between national judges of different Member States 
(transnational dialogue). It will also explore the concrete and potential effects of judicial interactions 
on a systemic level, that is, on: the domestic legal frameworks and jurisprudence of the Member 
States, as well as on relations between judiciary, administration and legislator. The Second Part 
focuses on common issues related to the termination of illegal stay, which received different solutions 
or legal argumentation by national courts in different Member States. The use of transnational 
interactions might have contributed, in these cases, to ensure the more coherent application of the 
Return Directive, enhanced fundamental rights protection of the TCNs. They may also have offered 
national judges a cost-effective inspirational legal source for solving the difficult questions raised 
before them.  
1. Instances of Judicial Interaction on the Interpretation and Implementation of the Return 
Directive  
This section discusses first the instances of direct judicial interactions (i.e. via the mechanism of 
preliminary reference) and will continue in the second Part with an analysis of the indirect judicial 
interactions (i.e. citation/reference to European judgments in the legal reasoning of national judgments). 
A. Direct Judicial Interactions 
The cases herein discussed herald the preliminary reference as a tool strategically used by national 
courts to remedy problematic legislative implementation of the Return Directive, such as: absence of 
return decision as the first step in the EU imposed return procedure; absence of a legal definition of the 
‘risk of absconding’; legality of the alternative mechanism of fine/house confinement for irregular 
migrants; and legality of criminalisation of entry in breach of a previous entry ban. These cases are 
particularly important due to the fact that the legal issues referred to the CJEU are of wider interest 
than to the referring Member States. Similar legal issues exist also in other Member States. These 
cases help thus to measure the impact of the preliminary reference also in non-referring domestic 
jurisdiction. It can be noticed that the preliminary rulings have varying degrees of impact in non-
referring Member States, while certain national courts readily suspend the proceedings to await the 
preliminary ruling of the CJEU in a case which was referred by a foreign national court, and 
subsequently give it full application in the pending case (Administrative Court of Thessaloniki, 
Judgment no. 692/2015, 23/04/2015), other national courts follow only to a certain extent the 
guidelines established by the CJEU (Dutch Supreme Court 4, December 2014, 12/05658). 
A.1. Criminalisation of Migration-related Offences 
Zaizoune (Spain/CJEU) – an example of vertical and horizontal judicial interaction on 
the topic of the return decision and removal order 
In Spain the jurisprudential ‘doctrine of fine’, developed as an alternative to removal, has stirred 
jurisprudential disagreement among Spanish courts. Applied since 2005 pursuant to Article 57(1) of the 
Spanish Immigration Act 4/2000, the practice mainly consisted of imposing fines on illegally staying 
TCNs, instead of removing them from Spanish territory. ‘Taking into account the principle of 
proportionality’, authorities could therefore resort to ‘removal’ (expulsiòn) only when there were 
‘negative factors’. The conformity of this doctrine with the RD came up before the Spanish Supreme 
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Court on the occasion of a direct appeal by a number of NGOs, which challenged several provisions of 
the Royal Decree 557/2011 as being contrary to the RD (judgment of 13 March 2013 (STS 988/2013)). 
While the so-called doctrine of fine remained unchanged until 2013, the Supreme Court became aware 
that the transposition of the Return Directive in Spanish Law would indubitably have an impact on the 
current practice of criminal sanctions and would, therefore, imply future adjustments. It further required 
national courts to strictly follow the EU return procedure, implying that they would subject TCNs 
illegally present in the country to a return decision. In a subsequent case, it also stressed that the TCN is 
required to regularise his or her situation, even after the payment of the fine; otherwise a return decision 
will apply (Andalucía, 7 October 2014, nº 1910/2014). These ground-breaking judgments of the 
Spanish Supreme Court setting aside the particular domestic legal model of sanctioning irregular TCNs 
in favour of the EU model of returning irregular TCNs, were, however, not followed by all Spanish 
courts. (Spanish Report, p. 5) In the context of divergent jurisprudential opinions, a regional court (the 
High Court of the Basque county) sought to put an end to the jurisprudential debate, by sending a 
preliminary reference to the CJEU. The referring national court essentially asked the CJEU to decide 
whether Articles 4, 6(1) and 8(1) of the RD precluded the application of Spanish legislation and its 
corresponding practice (also known as ‘the doctrine of fine’); these make irregular TCNs subject to 
either a fine, or depending on the circumstances, a removal order (High Court of Justice of the 
Autonomous Community of the Basque Country, 2014/C 93/32 (2013)). 
Despite the CJEU’s finding in ‘Zaizoune’, the High Court of Galicia relied on the principle of non-
retroactivity of the Court’s decisions to continue applying its established case-law regarding financial 
penalties (Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia, 323/2015 (05/2015)). The High Courts have 
recently developed an interesting reasoning aimed at reconciling the Court’s interpretation with the 
‘inherent’ Spanish conception of punitive measures: High Courts now explicitly reject the ‘alternative 
nature’ of fines and resort to removal as soon as an irregularly staying TCN is apprehended, as 
prescribed by the CJEU. However, in cases where no ‘aggravating circumstances’ (negative factors) 
exist, the ordinary procedure apply and Spanish judges may perform a deeper individual assessment of 
the applicant’s situation: it might, for instance, rely on Articles 5 and 6 RD in order to prevent the 
enforcement of removal when the principle of non-refoulement and/or the best interests of a child are 
at stake (Tribunal Superior de Murcia, Sala de lo Contencioso-Administrativo, STSJ 791/2015 
(09/2015)); or, as ruled by the High Court of Castilla y Leòn, reducing the length of the entry-bans 
from three to two years while continuing with the removal (Tribunal Superior de Justicia de 
Castilla y Leòn, Valladolid, Sala de lo Contencioso-Administrativo, STSJ 967/2015 (2015)). The 
ban is reduced to one year, in cases where the TCN has only performed non-authorized working 
activity (Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla y León, Valladolid, Sala de lo Contencioso-
Administrativo, STSJ 966/2015 (2015)). 
Sagor/Mbaye (Italy/CJEU) – an example of internal judicial interactions following the 
CJEU rulings 
The CJEU’s abundant case-law regarding the criminalisation of irregular stay also gave rise to an 
interesting exchange of views among national courts, notably in Italy as with the interpretation of the EU 
cases Sagor and Mbaye. In 2012, the Court of Monza explicitly referred to Sagor where the Justice of the 
Peace had previously imposed a fine of 5000 Euros on a TCN who illegally entered Italian territory. It 
stated that the substitution/conversion mechanism applicable (according to which a fine can be replaced 
by a house confinement) was not compatible with the Return Directive. Therefore, the first Instance 
criminal Court should have raised this issue and disregarded it if deemed to contradict EU law. The 
Court, however, did not address or suggest any alternative to be applied by the tribunal, likely to be 
compatible with the RD (Court of Monza, 2560/2012 (12/2012)). One year later, the Italian Court of 
Cassation referred to Achughbabian when stating that home confinement could be an option as long as it 
does not contravene the Directive’s objectives and the enforcement of the TCN’s return. The Court thus 
overturned the Justice of the Peace’s decision in the first instance, which interpreted the Directive as 
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preventing the MS from imposing home confinement instead of financial penalties as criminal sentences 
brought against TCNs. (Corte di Cassazione – Supreme Court, 35587/2013 (08/2013)).  
Skerdjan Celaj (Italy/CJEU) – an example of follow-up reaction by the referring 
national jurisdiction 
As for the correct application of criminal sanctions by Member States, the CJEU recently ruled on 
the criminalisation of re-entries in breach of valid entry bans, as requested by the Tribunal of Florence 
(Italy) in the case Skerdjan Celaj (Tribunale di Firenze – Court of Florence, N. 941/2013, 
(05/2014)). Unlike the AG’s opinion, the Court stated that criminal measures sanctioning illegal re-
entries could be admissible, in as much as they apply to ‘illegally staying third-country nationals for 
whom the application of the procedure established by the Return Directive resulted in their being 
returned’, but who then re-entered the Member State’s territory irregularly. The Court of Justice 
required that for the application of the RD to be excluded, the first entry ban must have been issued in 
compliance with Article 11 RD (a matter which is for the referring court to determine).  
It seems that the Italian referring court (Tribunal of Firenze) did not find a supporter of its view in 
the CJEU, namely that considering Italian legislation as not in conformity with the RD. The Court of 
Justice established that re-entry differs from a first illegal entry and permitted criminalisation of re-
entry in breach of an entry ban. The Italian referring court conformed to the Court of Justice’s 
interpretation and upheld the criminal sanction of imprisonment proposed by the public prosecutor. 
It is interesting to note that a legislative framework that is similar to the Italian one exists in the 
Netherlands. The difference is that the Dutch Council of State does not require the competent 
authorities to check whether the return procedure had been fully applied, as required by the Court of 
Justice (Dutch Supreme Court 4, December 2014, 12/05658; Tribunale di Firenze – Court of 
Florence, N. 941/2013, (05/2014)). The Court of Justice ruling, dating from 1
 
October 2015 is for the 
time being, too recent. It remains to be seen what will be the impact of the judgment on national 
courts’ interpretation and subsequent national case-law.  
A.2. Interpretation of the ‘Risk of Absconding’ 
Pending Preliminary Ruling (Czech Republic/CJEU) 
According to Article 7(4) of the RD, voluntary departure can be refused if one of the three 
circumstances therein provided are found to exist. All the Member States have not though transposed 
this list of three circumstances. For instance, Hungary has its own list of circumstances,
6
 the 
Bulgarian implementing legislation does not include the risk of absconding, but only ‘threat to 
national security or public order’7; while Czech legislation does not include the risk of absconding and 
the dismissal of an application for legal stay as being manifestly unfounded or fraudulent. Faced with 
these inconsistencies between the national transposition of legislation and the RD, national courts have 
either sought direct guidance from the CJEU or indirect evidence, by interpreting the existing 
jurisprudence of the CJEU.  
The Czech Supreme Court recently sent a preliminary request to the CJEU, seeking to obtain an 
answer on how to interpret national legislation to ensure conformity with the relevant EU law (C-
                                                     
6 Section 42 of Act No II of 2007 provided the following four circumstances ‘a) the third-country national’s right of residence 
was terminated due to his/her expulsion or exclusion, or for whom an alert has been issued in the SIS for the purpose of 
refusing entry and the right of residence; b) the third-country national’s application for residence permit was refused by 
the authority on the grounds referred to in Paragraphs b) and d) of Subsection (1) of Section 18; c) the third-country 
national has expressly refused to leave the territory of the Member States of the European Union voluntarily, or, based on 
other substantiated reasons, is not expected to abide by the decision for his/her expulsion; d) the third-country national’s 
residence in Hungary represents a serious threat to public security, public policy or national security’. 
7 See, the Law on Foreign Nationals in the Republic of Bulgaria, Article 39b (4). 
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528/15, Al Chodor and others, op.cit.). In light of the fact that the Czech Aliens Act does not refer to 
the risk of absconding as a ground for refusing voluntary departure, on 24th September 2015, the 
Supreme Administrative Court addressed a preliminary reference to the CJEU asking for clarification 
on this matter of legislative conformity. Although the preliminary reference concerns the definition of 
the ‘risk of absconding’ in Art. 2(n) the Dublin III, the judgment is reckoned to also affect cases 
concerning return of irregular migrants outside of the EU.  
B. Indirect Judicial Interaction 
B.1. The significant Influence of El Dridi and Achughbabian 
Following the CJEU’s El Dridi judgment, it seems that national courts are slowly accepting the 
idea of extending their judicial review beyond the manifest errors committed by national authorities. 
They are prepared to assess, too, whether the authorities have respected the principles of gradualism, 
individualism and proportionality, in particular where the fundamental rights or procedural guarantees 
of the TCNs are at issue. Significant changes have occurred in the practice of the supreme courts of 
Bulgaria, Italy and Spain, as they have aligned themselves and their interpretation of the RD with the 
CJEU’s. The national authorities’ decisions granting VD have been considered, since 2014, by the 
Italian Corte di Cassazione to be an integral part of the RD which is subject to full judicial review 
(Italian Corte di Cassazione, Judgment No.437/2014). The Spanish Supreme Court changed, in 
2013, the long established doctrine of a fine requiring that public authorities follow the Directive as 
regards the precise steps in the return procedure (judgment of 13 March 2013 (STS 988/2013)). The 
Bulgarian Supreme Administrative Court more readily assesses the conformity of national legislation 
and administrative decisions with the RD and CJEU jurisprudence (Dorofeev, 12 December 2011, 
15505/2010, (Hossam Eldin, judgment of the same court, 07 March 2012, 6339/2011). In two 
cases the CJEU quashed the administration’s decision to refuse a VD period. The CJEU did so on the 
basis of inadequate or insufficient proof establishing that the TCN represents a danger to national 
security or public order. The mandatory nature of the voluntary departure measure is increasingly 
recognised as the preferred means of return based directly on Article 7 RD (e.g. Wojewódzki Sąd 
Administracyjny w Warszawie ((Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Warszawie, IV SA/Wa 
2918/12 – WSA, 25/03/2013); (judgment of 17.10.2011, A858-2332/2011); (Hossam Eldin, 
judgment of the same court, 07 March 2012, 6339/2011). 
Furthermore, El Dridi and Achughbabian are also the first cases in which the Court of Justice has 
touched upon the sensitive issue of criminal law, applied to migration-related offences. These 
judgments (see section 1.a.) led to important changes in some Member States’ legal and judicial 
systems. While certain Member States strictly followed the Court’s interpretation – France reformed 
its criminal legislation, abolishing its former system of ‘police custody’ (Advisory opinion from the 
Court of Cassation, 9002 (06/2012)). The Netherlands enshrined the principle according to which 
criminal imprisonment can only be imposed when all the steps of the return procedure have been 
applied (Supreme Court, 12/05522 (12/2013)), others, like the Czech Republic, intended to 
somehow restrict the scope of application of the Court’s case-law, notably for suspended prison 
sentences given out during the course of the return procedure. In this regard, the Czech Supreme 
Court admitted such criminal sanctions when the prior use of administrative law proceedings failed in 
forcing the TCN to leave EU territory (in the present case, the TCN had neither complied with the 
return decision nor with the subsequent punitive administrative measures taken against him) (Nejvyšší 
soud (Supreme Court), 7 Tdo 500/2014 (05/2014)). However, with regard to stateless people, the 
Czech Supreme Court ruled that prior consideration for the return procedure was not required (given 
the lack of reasonable prospect of removal) so that any further assessment should be made in the light 
of domestic law. While criminal law is likely to apply in practice, the prison sentence imposed (in one 
particular case, up to ten months) is not yet fair and proportionate ((Nejvyšší soud (Supreme Court), 
8 Tdo 230/2014 (02/2014)). 
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Finally, there are some cases in which national courts explicitly rely on the CJEU’s case law in order 
to fill the gap resulting from the non-transposition of the Return Directive in a given Member State.  
B.2. National courts relying on the CJEU jurisprudence to offer direct effect to EU legal provisions  
This was notably the case with the Dutch Council of State, confronted with the general issue of the 
conformity of national legislation governing return and asylum procedure with Article 7 RD. The 
Council of State was obliged to assess an administrative decision establishing forced return in an 
accelerated procedure without any period of VD immediately after a TCN’s renewed asylum 
application was rejected. More particularly they had to decide whether this was in conformity with 
Article 7 RD. The Ministry justified its decision to reject the residence permit for a certain period of 
time and to order immediate expulsion on the basis of Article 28(2) of the Asylum Procedure Directive 
2005/85 and Article 7(4) RD which mentions as grounds justifying refusal to grant a VD period the 
‘application for a legal stay has been dismissed as manifestly unfounded or fraudulent’. The Ministry, 
first, highlighted that at the time of the administrative decision (26.02.2011) the Netherlands had not 
implemented Article 7 of the RD. The Council disagreed, and held that the applicant can nevertheless 
rely directly on Article 7 RD since, on the basis of the Becker judgment of the CJEU, individuals can 
directly rely on provisions of EU Directives, after the period of implementation has expired when they 
are ‘unconditional and sufficiently precise’. Article 7(1) and (4) RD were held to be directly effective 
by the Council of State. Second, the Council rejected the argument that the Ministry is justified in 
refusing VD on the basis of Article 28(2) AP Directive and Article 7(4) RD, since, the legislator had 
chosen not to implement Article 28, par 2 of the Asylum Procedures Directive (2005/85) in Dutch 
legislation. Therefore, according to jurisprudence of the CJEU (judgement of 21 October 2010, C-
227/09, Accardo, paragraphs 46 en 47) the derogating provisions in question cannot be relied on 
directly by the authorities against individuals, for the purpose of denying TCNs, such as the applicant 
in the main proceedings, a period for voluntary departure. The Council of State quashed the first 
instance court’s judgment and annulled the administrative decision of January 26, 2011 on the grounds 
that it contained a return decision contrary to Article 7 of the Return Directive (in a judgment of 
12.04.2012, 201102602/1/V2). 
B.3. The effect of the Boudjilida preliminary ruling preliminary remarks
8
  
The first instance administrative court of Thessaloniki postponed the delivery of a judgment in a 
case challenging the conformity of an administrative decision ordering voluntary return in 30 days on 
grounds of violation of the right to be heard; this was based on the pending preliminary request of the 
French court in the Boudjlida case. The Greek Court (decision no 14/2014), in light of the request for 
a preliminary ruling by a French Court concerning a third-country national’s right to a judicial review, 
postponed the final judgement regarding the legality of the concerned measure of the return of the 
applicant. After the publication of the CJEU judgement C-166/13, Mukarubega, and C-249/13, 
Khaled Boudjlida, the case was brought back for a hearing. The claim put forward in the application, 
namely that the third country national was not adequately heard before issuing a removal order, was 
accepted by the Court. Thus, the Court annulled the contested removal order. Furthermore, the Court 
remitted the case to the administration with the obligation, to call her to a hearing where she would 
have the possibility to expose facts that could be properly discussed and might influence the removal 
order (e.g. she could justify her stay in the country with a residence permit of another type provided by 
national legislation) (692/2015, 23/04/2015). 
                                                     
8 A more detailed discussion will follow up in the second edition of the REDIAL Electronic Journal. 
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B.4. The Added Value of ‘Judicial Interaction’ in the Implementation of the Directive 
Having explored various modes of judicial interaction, it seems that certain national courts 
immediately conform to the preliminary rulings of the CJEU, and readily set aside conflicting national 
legislation: e.g. Italian courts following the El Dridi CJEU judgment; French courts following the 
Achughbabian CJEU judgment. However, other national courts have adapted their national 
jurisprudence to the CJEU precepts more slowly (Spain, post-Zaizoune). As long as the requirements 
set out by the Return Directive and jurisprudentially confirmed by the CJEU are met at domestic 
level, it is less important whether the compliance method that is used is disapplication of national law 
in favour of direct application of the Directive, or conform interpretation. National courts have at their 
disposal a number of judicial interaction techniques to ensure primacy of the EU treaty and Return 
Directive based provisions, ranging from: consistent interpretation of national law with EU law; the 
power/duty to make a reference for a preliminary ruling; proportionality within the margin of 
deference afforded by the EU law; mutual recognition of foreign judgments; comparative reasoning 
with national legislation and jurisprudence from another Member State; disapplication of national law 
due to violation of EU norms.
9
  
The post-Zaizoune saga shows that national courts sometimes prefer to find ways of securing 
compliance with the CJEU judgment(s) without having recourse to disapplication. Instead, Spanish 
courts developed a constructive judicial dialogue, by having recourse to an innovative conform 
interpretation technique, which manages to simultaneously acknowledge the authority of EU law, as 
well as national law and judicial doctrine.  
Nevertheless, regardless of the outcome of direct or indirect vertical judicial interaction for the legal 
order of the referring court or other national jurisdiction,
10
 these types of interaction lead to a 
beneficial exchange of views among judicial authorities: more elaborate judicial reasoning; 
questioning of existing judicial doctrines or domestic political or executive practices. Ultimately, they 
help to tackle concrete difficulties resulting from the practical implementation of the Directive.  
That being said, the lack of explicit references should not necessarily be taken as a sign of judicial 
isolation or a firm refusal to take the European jurisprudence into consideration. Due to judicial 
economy considerations, the CJEU rules set in the preliminary rulings might be followed without 
citing the relevant CJEU jurisprudence. Ultimately, judicial interactions, whether direct (e.g. 
preliminary reference), indirect (e.g. citation of European or foreign judgments), informal (e.g. 
meetings between national judges, circulation of legal enquiries or questionnaire on the application of 
a certain EU legal provision) are not an end in themselves, but should help to proactively respond to 
the requirements of the Return Directive and respect of European fundamental rights. 
 
                                                     
9 On the definition of ‘Judicial Interaction Techniques’, see Final Handbook Judicial Interaction Techniques – Their 
Potential and Use in European Fundamental Rights Adjudication’, available online, p. 38-40. 
10 That is, depending on the issue at stake, the CJEU sometimes rules more in favour of the TCNs’ rights – Zh. and O., while 
sometimes relies on the principle of efficiency of the Return procedure – Zaizoune, El Dridi etc.).  
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2. Ruling in isolation – Similar Return-related Issues Receiving Varied Answers from National 
Courts 
The above direct/indirect judicial interactions (mainly between the CJEU and the Member States’ 
judicial authorities) are unfortunately not as widespread as they could be. A still considerable number 
of common issues, related to the termination of illegal stay, continue to be solved differently by 
national courts. Some of these cases, which could have served as inspiration for other national courts, 
will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Prior Administrative Assessment before Conferring/Refusing a Period of Voluntary Departure on 
the basis of Article 8 ECHR In several jurisdictions (Belgian, Dutch, Slovenian), national courts had 
to assess whether issues related to Article 8 ECHR needed to be taken into consideration by the 
administration when establishing voluntary departure or removal. For instance, they had to assess 
whether the right to private life should have been taken into account in considering whether to grant 
VD, or whether this related only to removal cases. Likewise, they had to decide whether the principle 
of proportionality and the respect of Article 8 ECHR might be legitimate grounds for rejecting the 
enforcement of removal orders.  
The Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania (judgment of 17.10.2011, A858-2332/2011) had 
to define whether issues related to Article 8 ECHR had to be assessed by the administration only 
should the TCN not leave the territory voluntary, or whether it had more general application. The 
applicant, in this case, had illegally stayed in Lithuania for several years and had had a son there. In 
2012 she was ordered to leave Lithuania together with her son within fifteen days. The administration 
argued that according to national legislation, Article 8 ECHR is only relevant if the alien does not 
leave the territory voluntarily. The Court ruled that although the Law, expressis verbis, does not 
establish the obligation to evaluate relevant circumstances at the stage of adoption of decision, 
ordering the alien to depart from Lithuania, the provisions of Directive 2008/115 favour voluntary 
departure and require an evaluation of all relevant circumstances before a return decision is adopted. 
Thus a systemic interpretation of the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens leads to the conclusion that all 
relevant circumstances should be evaluated in all cases, be it a decision ordering voluntary departure 
or a decision ordering forced expulsion. A different interpretation of the Law might result in violation 
of Article 8 of the ECHR, since the alien concerned might find himself or herself in an uncertain 
situation for a long time. It is interesting to note that the Supreme Administrative Court supported its 
conclusions by invoking the opinion of the AG in Zurita Garcia.
11
 
It seems that the Dutch Council of State shared a different interpretation on the need to check the 
compliance of a return decision with Article 8 ECHR. The Council held that, since the TCN can apply 
for a residence permit on grounds of family life, then the public administration is not required to 
perform the specific removal examination in conformity with Article 8 ECHR. In another case, the 
Dutch Council of State held that family aspects can be considered in the context of prolonging the 
period for voluntary return, as provided for in Article 7(2) RD (ABRVS 1 November 2012, 
201111708/1/V3). According to the CJEU judgment in Boudjlida, national authorities ‘must 
necessarily observe the obligations imposed by Article 5 RD [when issuing return decisions]’ (see 
Boudjlida, C-249/13, para 49). 
By contrast, the Supreme Court of Slovenia explicitly referred to ECtHR case-law and to EU law 
when addressing the issue of Article 8 ECHR, to be considered in the context of voluntary departure. 
                                                     
11 C-261/08 Zurita Garcia, ECLI:EU:C:2009:648. This is a case decided by the CJEU along similar lines to those in 
Zaizoune, namely whether a third-country national is unlawfully present on the territory of a Member State because he or 
she does not fulfil, or no longer fulfil, the conditions of duration of stay applicable there, that ‘Member State is not 
obliged to adopt a decision to expel that person’. It should be noted that the period for the transposition of the Return 
Directive (up to 24 December 2010) had not yet elapsed at that time. 
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In this case, the TCN challenged a VD measure, with attached obligations, on the grounds of the 
TCN’s right to a family life. The Supreme Court held that the return measure had to comply with the 
principle of proportionality to find out whether the restriction of the right to a family life, as enshrined 
in Articles 7 EU Charter and 8 ECHR, is legitimate. The Supreme Court has stated that the principle of 
proportionality means that the following questions must be asked: is the contested measure necessary; 
is the contested measure feasible in the sense that it can actually achieve a legitimate goal; is there 
proportionality in the narrow sense? The Court added that the infringement of the right to the family 
life of the applicant must be weighed against the right of the State to control its borders and to control 
immigration flows. The Supreme Court did not apply the aforementioned standards in a given case. It, 
however, quashed the judgment of the Administrative Courts and returned the case to the 
Administrative Court with the indication that the Administrative Court should apply these rules to the 
case in hand. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court stated that the Administrative Court should have taken 
into account the fact that the applicant entered Slovenia illegally; that he lived in Slovenia illegally; 
and that he was certainly aware that he did not have a legal stay in Slovenia. In this judgment, the 
Supreme Court referred to the UN Convention on the Rights of a Child, Article 8 of the ECHR, 
including judgments in cases of Nunez v. the Netherlands, Boultif v. Switzerland, Maslow v. Austria, 
and EU Law: Article 7 of the Charter and recital of the Returns Directive.  
The Administrative Court, after having received this judgement, followed the guidelines set by the 
Supreme Court and took into consideration the right to family life and applied the principle of 
proportionality. Nevertheless, the TCN’s application was still dismissed on grounds that the VD 
measure with attached obligations was not disproportionate. The Supreme Court confirmed the 
judicial assessment of the Administrative Court in appeal. 
A. Judicial Interpretation of the Proportionality Assessment in the Pre-removal Context 
When applying the Return Directive, Member States are notably required to comply with general 
principles, such as effectiveness or proportionality. As already mentioned in section 1.b., it is 
interesting to note that in some Member States, the judicial review of this last principle is even broader 
and sometimes goes beyond the EU law’s interpretation of ‘gradualism’ and balanced appreciation of 
the measures adopted. This is notably the case for the Supreme Bulgarian Administrative Court which 
relied on domestic law. The court stated that proportionality also implies an enforcement of a removal 
order ‘on time’, whereas otherwise any changes of circumstances in the TCN’s situation as well as the 
legal grounds invoked at the date of serving should be taken into account (Върховен 
административен съд (The Supreme Administrative Court court), 3366/2011 (06/2012)). 
Although in Austrian law, a removal does not represent a second decision, it has to be specifically 
subject to a proportionality assessment and to a judicial review, which is distinct from the one 
applying to the return decision (Verwaltungsgerichtshof (High Administrative Court), 
2010/21/0056 (10/2011)). Finally, in France, proportionality in resorting to pre-removal measures 
now implies giving preference to house arrest instead of administrative detention (Cour 
admnistrative d’appel de Versailles (Administrative Court of appeal of Versailles), 13VE03044 
(03/2014)), unless the former is judged insufficient to prevent the TCN absconding.  
B. Removal Orders Issued against Unaccompanied Minors (UM) and Prior Consideration to 
‘Reception Guarantees’ 
The Dutch Council of State interprets Article 10(2) RD as not covering the ‘voluntary return’ of 
unaccompanied minors, considering indeed that that requirement of ‘adequate reception facilities’ 
does not apply in such circumstances (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State 
(Council of State), 201104976/1/V2 (06/2012)). The German Administrative Court interprets, 
meanwhile, the Return Directive as de facto suspending any deportation of UM as long as ‘the 
immigration authorities have not ensured the concrete fact that a member of the minor’s family or 
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another authorized person or institution will receive the minor’. In the Court’s view, the RD implies 
that if a negative decision is issued, the unaccompanied minor should be able to challenge his or her 
return before the Courts and to claim a follow-up protection order from the government 
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht (German Federal Administrative Court), 10 C 13.12 (06/2013)). 
C. Circumstances Likely to Extend/Reduce a Period for Voluntary Departure (AT, HU, BG, NL) 
The Return Directive allows a considerable margin of discretion to the Member States under 
Chapter II of the RD. For instance, voluntary departure can take place in a period from seven to 30 
days: the Member States can choose whether to confer the voluntary departure measure automatically 
or by individual application. The Member States can include other circumstances than those 
enumerated in Article 7(2) as grounds for extending the VD period. There is no strict list of 
circumstances qualifying as ‘risk of absconding’ or ‘risk to public policy’. Article 8(4) does not 
exhaustively prescribe the coercive measures available to Member States for carrying out removal. 
The specific circumstances when removal may be postponed are also not exhaustively enumerated, 
with Art. 9 providing only requirements to be followed when establishing these measures at national 
level. According to Article 11, Member States may exceed the five years period of an entry ban in 
cases of a threat to public policy, public security or national security. However there is no precise limit 
on the duration of an entry ban. This discretionary power left to the Member States when 
implementing the RD and taking legislative choices is not though absolute. There are limits imposed 
by EU law and the jurisprudence of the CJEU. For instance, the respect of fundamental rights and 
ensuring an effective return of irregular migrants: the Member States cannot ignore these aspects when 
they act within their margin of discretion. Certain national courts have paid significantly more 
attention to the protection of fundamental rights when deciding on the prolongation of voluntary 
departure or on reducing the voluntary departure period. 
For instance, the Austrian High Administrative Court adopted a broader interpretation of the 
concept of ‘specific circumstances in individual cases’ in favour of ensuring the fundamental rights of 
TCNs and a fair balance between personal and public interest. For instance the High Administrative 
Court included, among its specific circumstances, those on the ground in the country of destination 
(High Administrative Court, Judgment No.2012/21/0072, 16.5.2013). The Federal Administrative 
Court included medical reasons, such as: eye surgery and the pregnancy period of the partner of the 
TCN as circumstances justifying the prolongation of the VD period. 
As to the definition of the ‘risk of absconding’ as a legal grounds for reducing or refusing VD, 
certain national courts reject general statements invoked by the administration as constituting ‘risk of 
public policy’, such as: risk of committing a crime. As long as the administration’s statements are 
deprived of concrete factual references to individual situations, they cannot form the grounds for 
refusing voluntary departure (see more on this in Part II – Risk of absconding, and European 
Synthesis Report, p. 12-14, 16-19). 
D. Circumstances likely to reduce the period of entry bans 
The Austrian High Administrative Court has, for instance, shortened a period of entry ban of 
more than five years to ensure respect of Article 8 ECHR (High Administrative Court, VwGH 
2012/21/0044, 2.10.2012). The Vienna Administrative Court, meanwhile, reduced the residence ban 
of ten to seven years because of the need for a fair balance between drug offences and established 
family life. 
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V. General Conclusion: The Added Value of Judicial Interactions on Return Policy 
Having explored these various dimensions of judicial interaction, the question is: what is their 
added value for the implementation of the Return Directive, and why is it desirable to have them? 
It seems that vertical judicial dialogue has improved the efficient implementation of the Return 
Directive by: 1) filling up the gaps left by the legislator (Zh. and O.); 2) eliminating incompatibilities 
between national legislation and the Return Directive provisions (El Dridi, Achughbabian); and 3) 
raising to a certain extent the national level of fundamental rights protection (Boudjlida) 
The preliminary ruling also has the capacity to ensure the coherent interpretation and application of 
the RD, in a field that is subject to different jurisdictional models (i.e. civil, administrative, criminal), 
and thus subject to various methods of judicial interpretation. Therefore, regardless of the type of 
courts assessing the implementation of the RD and their constitutionally recognised powers vis-à-vis 
the state authorities, the preliminary rulings of the CJEU have confirmed certain common powers to 
national courts deriving from the EU legislation: 1) setting aside conflicting national legislation (post-
El Dridi, Achubabian, Sagor); 2) filling the national legislative acts with directly effective provisions 
of the RD and relevant EU secondary legislation, without having to wait for the national legislator to 
fill these gaps or bring national legislation in line with EU legal provisions (in a judgment of 
12.04.2012, 201102602/1/V2). Additionally CJEU preliminary rulings force changes in domestic 
jurisprudence that is in conflict with European law (post-Zaizoune). This might ultimately lead to 
common judicial interpretation and understanding of the sometimes abstract and general RD 
provisions (e.g. Z. Zh and O.). It is interesting to note that certain national courts oppose preliminary 
CJEU rulings (post-Zaizoune, Spain), preferring to use consistent interpretation rather than 
disapplication, as suggested by the CJEU. Other national courts, though, conform without opposition 
to the CJEU preliminary rulings, even if they disagree with the CJEU’s interpretation of the Return 
Directive (e.g. Celaj, Italy). 
However, besides this traditional type of interaction, there are alternative forms of judicial 
dialogue, though rarely used in practice by national courts. Limited judicial cross-referencing can 
notably be explained by: limited access to foreign cases; language barriers; time constraints; and 
strong differences across legal and judicial cultures. More fundamentally, explicit references to EU 
law considerations may also be limited by national capacities and resources. For instance, French 
national courts, especially first instance ones, dealt in 2011 with more than 190,000 administrative 
cases (30% of which were on immigration law). Time and resources limitation do not allow a 
systematic dissemination of national judgments or in-depth analyses based on foreign legislation and 
judgments. 
While waiting for legal improvements from national legislators in adequately transposing the 
Return Directive (limiting for instance the use of discretionary clauses, better defining overly vague 
and general terms), challenges remain for national jurisdictions. They must ensure: greater internal 
consistency (such as avoiding conflicting judgments emerging from courts or even chambers from the 
same court having overlapping jurisdiction
12
); transparency (public and accessible case-law); and 
transnational exchanges of knowledge. As demonstrated by academic initiatives such as the present 
REDIAL project but also our previous project CONTENTION on judicial control of return detention, 
online platforms and case-law databases could be valuable tools to ensure that national judges active 
in this particular field have access to the relevant information.  
Formal judicial interactions of the types discussed above can be complemented by informal 
mechanisms of judicial consultation. A possible additional tool that might offer prompt support to 
national judges, in addressing difficult and concrete issues on the application of the Return Directive 
and that, at the same time, might ensure coherent application of the RD, would be an online 
                                                     
12 See e.g. the diverging interpretation following Achughbabian by the CA Paris, B 11/04993 and B 11 04971. 
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questionnaire for national judges (a mechanism which is established in the ambit of civil judicial 
cooperation). This would be filled in and then sent automatically to all the judges on the same 
network. Each of the national judges would there express his or her view on the question submitted by 
another domestic judge, and thus a complete comparative overview would be immediately available to 
judges, who are ruling on the return of irregular migrants. Something like this happened last December 
when a Hungarian Judge addressed several questions on voluntary departure and entry bans to the 
REDIAL judicial network. A dozen answers from other participating judges dealing with similar 
issues were sent in and a fruitful exchange of views leads to a common understanding and 
interpretation of the Return Directive provisions. 
More flexible and less costly than questions referred to European Courts, ‘horizontal’ interactions 
among national courts across the European Union thus represent a significant source of inspiration 
when interpreting and implementing the Return Directive at national level. The exchange of 
knowledge is desirable not only to ensure a better implementation of EU law in national systems but 
also to guarantee that TCNs, within the scope of the RD, have better protection for their fundamental 
rights and procedural guarantees. As demonstrated by the jurisprudence here discussed (see, in 
particular the French, Belgian, Slovenian jurisprudence on Article 7 and 8 RD, and German 
jurisprudence on Article 10 and 11 RD), a stronger protection of the TCN’s fundamental rights13 can 
be ensured through judicial interaction. 
                                                     
13 For instance, the right to private and family life, proportionality assessment, limited criminal sanctions, protection of 
minors etc.  
